skip to main content

Search for: All records

Creators/Authors contains: "You, Pengcheng"

Note: When clicking on a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number, you will be taken to an external site maintained by the publisher. Some full text articles may not yet be available without a charge during the embargo (administrative interval).
What is a DOI Number?

Some links on this page may take you to non-federal websites. Their policies may differ from this site.

  1. Electricity markets are cleared by a two-stage, sequential process consisting of a forward (day-ahead) market and a spot (real-time) market. While their design goal is to achieve efficiency, the lack of sufficient competition introduces many opportunities for price manipulation. To discourage this phenomenon, some Independent System Operators (ISOs) mandate generators to submit (approximately) truthful bids in the day-ahead market. However, without fully accounting for all participants' incentives (generators and loads), the application of such a mandate may lead to unintended consequences. In this paper, we model and study the interactions of generators and inelastic loads in a two-stage settlement where generators are required to bid truthfully in the day-ahead market. We show that such mandate, when accounting for generator and load incentives, leads to a {generalized} Stackelberg-Nash game where load decisions (leaders) are performed in day-ahead market and generator decisions (followers) are relegated to the real-time market. Furthermore, the use of conventional supply function bidding for generators in real-time, does not guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium. This motivates the use of intercept bidding, as an alternative bidding mechanism for generators in the real-time market. An equilibrium analysis in this setting, leads to a closed-form solution that unveils several insights. Particularly, it shows that, unlike standard two-stage markets, loads are the winners of the competition in the sense that their aggregate payments are less than that of the competitive equilibrium. Moreover, heterogeneity in generators cost has the unintended effect of mitigating loads market power. Numerical studies validate and further illustrate these insights. 
    more » « less
  2. This paper proposes a market mechanism for multi-interval electricity markets with generator and storage participants. Drawing ideas from supply function bidding, we introduce a novel bid structure for storage participation that allows storage units to communicate their cost to the market using energy cycling functions that map prices to cycle depths. The resulting market-clearing process--implemented via convex programming--yields corresponding schedules and payments based on traditional energy prices for power supply and per-cycle prices for storage utilization. We illustrate the benefits of our solution by comparing the competitive equilibrium of the resulting mechanism to that of an alternative solution that uses prosumer-based bids. Our solution shows several advantages over the prosumer-based approach. It does not require a priori price estimation. It also incentivizes participants to reveal their truthful costs, thus leading to an efficient, competitive equilibrium. Numerical experiments using New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) data validate our findings. 
    more » « less
  3. We consider the problem of designing a feedback controller that guides the input and output of a linear time-invariant system to a minimizer of a convex optimization problem. The system is subject to an unknown disturbance, piecewise constant in time, which shifts the feasible set defined by the system equilibrium constraints. Our proposed design combines proportional-integral control with gradient feedback, and enforces the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions in steady-state without incorporating dual variables into the controller. We prove that the input and output variables achieve optimality in steady-state, and provide a stability criterion based on absolute stability theory. The effectiveness of our approach is illustrated on a simple example system. 
    more » « less
  4. null (Ed.)
    Renewable portfolio standards are targeting high levels of variable solar photovoltaics (PV) in electric distribution systems, which makes reliability more challenging to maintain for distribution system operators (DSOs). Distributed energy resources (DERs), including smart, connected appliances and PV inverters, represent responsive grid resources that can provide flexibility to support the DSO in actively managing their networks to facilitate reliability under extreme levels of solar PV. This flexibility can also be used to optimize system operations with respect to economic signals from wholesale energy and ancillary service markets. Here, we present a novel hierarchical scheme that actively controls behind-the-meter DERs to reliably manage each unbalanced distribution feeder and exploits the available flexibility to ensure reliable operation and economically optimizes the entire distribution network. Each layer of the scheme employs advanced optimization methods at different timescales to ensure that the system operates within both grid and device limits. The hierarchy is validated in a large-scale realistic simulation based on data from the industry. Simulation results show that coordination of flexibility improves both system reliability and economics, and enables greater penetration of solar PV. Discussion is also provided on the practical viability of the required communications and controls to implement the presented scheme within a large DSO. 
    more » « less