Prosumers with generation and storage capabilities can supply en- ergy back to the grid, or trade their surplus with other prosumers for their mutual benefit. A prosumer aggregation that facilitates such trades will price the energy being traded to achieve an objective such as profit maximization, social welfare, or market equilibrium. We propose the use of reinforcement learning to design a trans- active controller to price energy in a prosumer aggregation. This has an advantage over other decentralized pricing mechanisms as it does not rely on iterative price settlement or load estimation by prosumers, and estimates the price in a day ahead manner. We present numerical case studies to evaluate our controller, and dis- cuss extensions to implement this in real prosumer aggregations.
more »
« less
A Market Mechanism for Truthful Bidding with Energy Storage
This paper proposes a market mechanism for multi-interval electricity markets with generator and storage participants. Drawing ideas from supply function bidding, we introduce a novel bid structure for storage participation that allows storage units to communicate their cost to the market using energy cycling functions that map prices to cycle depths. The resulting market-clearing process--implemented via convex programming--yields corresponding schedules and payments based on traditional energy prices for power supply and per-cycle prices for storage utilization. We illustrate the benefits of our solution by comparing the competitive equilibrium of the resulting mechanism to that of an alternative solution that uses prosumer-based bids. Our solution shows several advantages over the prosumer-based approach. It does not require a priori price estimation. It also incentivizes participants to reveal their truthful costs, thus leading to an efficient, competitive equilibrium. Numerical experiments using New York Independent System Operator (NYISO) data validate our findings.
more »
« less
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10350305
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Power Systems Computation Conference (PSCC)
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1-9
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
More Like this
-
-
This paper develops competitive bidding strategies for an online linear optimization problem with inventory management constraints in both cost minimization and profit maximization settings. In the minimization problem, a decision maker should satisfy its time-varying demand by either purchasing units of an asset from the market or producing them from a local inventory with limited capacity. In the maximization problem, a decision maker has a time-varying supply of an asset that may be sold to the market or stored in the inventory to be sold later. In both settings, the market price is unknown in each timeslot and the decision maker can submit a finite number of bids to buy/sell the asset. Once all bids have been submitted, the market price clears and the amount bought/sold is determined based on the clearing price and submitted bids. From this setup, the decision maker must minimize/maximize their cost/profit in the market, while also devising a bidding strategy in the face of an unknown clearing price. We propose DEMBID and SUPBID, two competitive bidding strategies for these online linear optimization problems with inventory management constraints for the minimization and maximization setting respectively. We then analyze the competitive ratios of the proposed algorithms and show that the performance of our algorithms approaches the best possible competitive ratio as the maximum number of bids increases. As a case study, we use energy data traces from Akamai data centers, renewable outputs from NREL, and energy prices from NYISO to show the effectiveness of our bidding strategies in the context of energy storage management for a large energy customer participating in a real-time electricity market.more » « less
-
Electricity markets are cleared by a two-stage, sequential process consisting of a forward (day-ahead) market and a spot (real-time) market. While their design goal is to achieve efficiency, the lack of sufficient competition introduces many opportunities for price manipulation. To discourage this phenomenon, some Independent System Operators (ISOs) mandate generators to submit (approximately) truthful bids in the day-ahead market. However, without fully accounting for all participants' incentives (generators and loads), the application of such a mandate may lead to unintended consequences. In this paper, we model and study the interactions of generators and inelastic loads in a two-stage settlement where generators are required to bid truthfully in the day-ahead market. We show that such mandate, when accounting for generator and load incentives, leads to a {generalized} Stackelberg-Nash game where load decisions (leaders) are performed in day-ahead market and generator decisions (followers) are relegated to the real-time market. Furthermore, the use of conventional supply function bidding for generators in real-time, does not guarantee the existence of a Nash equilibrium. This motivates the use of intercept bidding, as an alternative bidding mechanism for generators in the real-time market. An equilibrium analysis in this setting, leads to a closed-form solution that unveils several insights. Particularly, it shows that, unlike standard two-stage markets, loads are the winners of the competition in the sense that their aggregate payments are less than that of the competitive equilibrium. Moreover, heterogeneity in generators cost has the unintended effect of mitigating loads market power. Numerical studies validate and further illustrate these insights.more » « less
-
While prior studies have designed incentive mechanisms to attract the public to share their collected data, they tend to ignore information asymmetry between data requesters and collectors. In reality, the sensing costs information (time cost, battery drainage, bandwidth occupation of mobile devices, and so on) is the private information of collectors, which is unknown by the data requester. In this article, we model the strategic interactions between health-data requester and collectors using a bilevel optimization model. Considering that the crowdsensing market is open and the participants are equal, we propose a Walrasian equilibrium-based pricing mechanism to coordinate the interest conflicts between health-data requesters and collectors. Specifically, based on the exchange economic theory, we transform the bilevel optimization problem into a social welfare maximization problem with the constraint condition that the balance between supply and demand, and dual decomposition is then employed to divide the social welfare maximization problem into a set of subproblems that can be solved by health-data requesters and collectors. We prove that the optimal task price is equal to the marginal utility generated by the collector's health data. To avoid obtaining the collector's private information, a distributed iterative algorithm is then designed to obtain the optimal task pricing strategy. Furthermore, we conduct computational experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed pricing mechanism and analyze the effects of intrinsic rewards, sensing costs on optimal task prices, and collectors' health-data supplies.more » « less
-
Electricity bill constitutes a significant portion of operational costs for large scale data centers. Empowering data centers with on-site storages can reduce the electricity bill by shaping the energy procurement from deregulated electricity markets with real-time price fluctuations. This work focuses on designing energy procurement and storage management strategies to minimize the electricity bill of storage-assisted data centers. Designing such strategies is challenging since the net energy demand of the data center and electricity market prices are not known in advance, and the underlying problem is coupled over time due to evolution of the storage level. Using competitive ratio as the performance measure, we propose an online algorithm that determines the energy procurement and storage management strategies using a threshold based policy. Our algorithm achieves the optimal competitive ratio of as a function of the price fluctuation ratio. We validate the algorithm using data traces from electricity markets and data-center energy demands. The results show that our algorithm achieves close to the offline optimal performance and outperforms existing alternatives.%more » « less
- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
-
Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- The DOI is not currently available.
