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Collaborative infrastructure systems are vital for managing scarce resources, particularly where user behaviors influence system sustainability. This study examines the relationship between design of constructed water infrastructure and strategic behaviors, focusing on flood irrigation systems as an example of collaborative infrastructure. The objectives are to investigate 1) whether shared water infrastructure can be effectively modeled using the stag hunt game framework and 2) how network topology impacts the strategic stability of user cooperation. Flood irrigation relies on collective action, where users balance risks of collaboration failure against benefits of successful cooperation. This situation closely aligns with stag hunt dynamics, in which users choose between a higher-value but riskier collaborative strategy or a lower-value, safer independent option. A key challenge arises when users opt out, increasing the burden on remaining collaborators. We apply a game-theoretic model using risk dominance criteria to analyze stability across four distinct infrastructure topologies: linear, tree, bus, and star. Results identify star and bus topologies as Pareto efficient, where a bus topology offers greater economic efficiency through reduced infrastructure costs and a star topology enhances stability due to equitable distribution of influence and reduced dependencies. An agent-based simulation validates analytical findings by dynamically captures user interactions under uncertainty and showing a strong correlation with game-theoretic results. Consequently, this study confirms the applicability of stag hunt frameworks for analyzing collaborative water infrastructure and provides practical insights into how topology design can influence cooperative resilience. These findings enhance knowledge for sustainable improvement of collaborative infrastructure.