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Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF) is the problem of moving multiple agents from starts to goals without collisions. Lifelong MAPF (LMAPF) extends MAPF by continuously assigning new goals to agents. We present our winning approach to the 2023 League of Robot Runners LMAPF competition, which leads us to several interesting research challenges and future directions. In this paper, we outline three main research challenges. The first challenge is to search for high-quality LMAPF solutions within a limited planning time (e.g., 1s per step) for a large number of agents (e.g., 10,000) or extremely high agent density (e.g., 97.7%). We present future directions such as developing more competitive rule-based and anytime MAPF algorithms and parallelizing state-of-the-art MAPF algorithms. The second challenge is to alleviate congestion and the effect of myopic behaviors in LMAPF algorithms. We present future directions, such as developing moving guidance and traffic rules to reduce congestion, incorporating future prediction and real-time search, and determining the optimal agent number. The third challenge is to bridge the gaps between the LMAPF models used in the literature and real-world applications. We present future directions, such as dealing with more realistic kinodynamic models, execution uncertainty, and evolving systems. 

Multi-Agent Path Finding (MAPF) involves determining paths for multiple agents to travel simultaneously and collision-free through a shared area toward given goal locations. This problem is computationally complex, especially when dealing with large numbers of agents, as is common in realistic applications like autonomous vehicle coordination. Finding an optimal solution is often computationally infeasible, making the use of approximate, suboptimal algorithms essential. Adding to the complexity, agents might act in a self-interested and strategic way, possibly misrepresenting their goals to the MAPF algorithm if it benefits them. Although the field of mechanism design offers tools to align incentives, using these tools without careful consideration can fail when only having access to approximately optimal outcomes. In this work, we introduce the problem of scalable mechanism design for MAPF and propose three strategyproof mechanisms, two of which even use approximate MAPF algorithms. We test our mechanisms on realistic MAPF domains with problem sizes ranging from dozens to hundreds of agents. We find that they improve welfare beyond a simple baseline.