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A fundamental shortcoming of the concept of Nash equilibrium is its computational intractability: approximating Nash equilibria in normal-form games is PPAD-hard. In this paper, inspired by the ideas of smoothed analysis, we introduce a relaxed variant of Nash equilibrium called σ-smooth Nash equilibrium, for a {smoothness parameter} σ. In a σ-smooth Nash equilibrium, players only need to achieve utility at least as high as their best deviation to a σ-smooth strategy, which is a distribution that does not put too much mass (as parametrized by σ) on any fixed action. We distinguish two variants of σ-smooth Nash equilibria: strong σ-smooth Nash equilibria, in which players are required to play σ-smooth strategies under equilibrium play, and weak σ-smooth Nash equilibria, where there is no such requirement. We show that both weak and strong σ-smooth Nash equilibria have superior computational properties to Nash equilibria: when σ as well as an approximation parameter ϵ and the number of players are all constants, there is a {constant-time} randomized algorithm to find a weak ϵ-approximate σ-smooth Nash equilibrium in normal-form games. In the same parameter regime, there is a polynomial-time deterministic algorithm to find a strong ϵ-approximate σ-smooth Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game. These results stand in contrast to the optimal algorithm for computing ϵ-approximate Nash equilibria, which cannot run in faster than quasipolynomial-time, subject to complexity-theoretic assumptions. We complement our upper bounds by showing that when either σ or ϵ is an inverse polynomial, finding a weak ϵ-approximate σ-smooth Nash equilibria becomes computationally intractable. Our results are the first to propose a variant of Nash equilibrium which is computationally tractable, allows players to act independently, and which, as we discuss, is justified by an extensive line of work on individual choice behavior in the economics literature. 

We study the role of interaction in the Common Randomness Generation (CRG) and Secret Key Generation (SKG) problems. In the CRG problem, two players, Alice and Bob, respectively get samples X1, X2, . . . and Y1, Y2, . . . with the pairs (X1, Y1), (X2, Y2), . . . being drawn independently from some known probability distribution μ. They wish to communicate so as to agree on L bits of randomness. The SKG problem is the restriction of the CRG problem to the case where the key is required to be close to random even to an eavesdropper who can listen to their communication (but does not have access to the inputs of Alice and Bob). In this work, we study the relationship between the amount of communication and the number of rounds of interaction in both the CRG and the SKG problems. Specifically, we construct a family of distributions μ = μr,n,L, parametrized by integers r, n and L, such that for every r there exists a constant b = b(r) for which CRG (respectively SKG) is feasible when (Xi, Yi) ~ μr,n,L with r + 1 rounds of communication, each consisting of O(log n) bits, but when restricted to r/2 − 2 rounds of interaction, the total communication must exceed Ω(n/ logb(n)) bits. Prior to our work no separations were known for r ≥ 2.