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Ride-pooling, which accommodates multiple passenger requests in a single trip, has the potential to substantially enhance the throughput of mobility-on-demand (MoD) systems. This paper investigates MoD systems that operate mixed fleets composed of “basic supply” and “augmented supply” vehicles. When the basic supply is insufficient to satisfy demand, augmented supply vehicles can be repositioned to serve rides at a higher operational cost. We formulate the joint vehicle repositioning and ride-pooling assignment problem as a two-stage stochastic integer program, where repositioning augmented supply vehicles precedes the realization of ride requests. Sequential ride-pooling assignments aim to maximize total utility or profit on a shareability graph: a hypergraph representing the matching compatibility between available vehicles and pending requests. Two approximation algorithms for midcapacity and high-capacity vehicles are proposed in this paper; the respective approximation ratios are [Formula: see text] and [Formula: see text], where p is the maximum vehicle capacity plus one. Our study evaluates the performance of these approximation algorithms using an MoD simulator, demonstrating that these algorithms can parallelize computations and achieve solutions with small optimality gaps (typically within 1%). These efficient algorithms pave the way for various multimodal and multiclass MoD applications.

History: This paper has been accepted for the Transportation Science Special Issue on Emerging Topics in Transportation Science and Logistics.

Funding: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation [Grants CCF-2006778 and FW-HTF-P 2222806], the Ford Motor Company, and the Division of Civil, Mechanical, and Manufacturing Innovation [Grants CMMI-1854684, CMMI-1904575, and CMMI-1940766].

Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/trsc.2021.0349 .

 

Emerging on-demand service platforms (OSPs) have recently embraced teamwork as a strategy for stimulating workers’ productivity and mediating temporal supply and demand imbalances. This research investigates the team contest scheme design problem considering work schedules. Introducing teams on OSPs creates a hierarchical single-leader multi-follower game. The leader (platform) establishes rewards and intrateam revenue-sharing rules for distributing workers’ payoffs. Each follower (team) competes with others by coordinating the schedules of its team members to maximize the total expected utility. The concurrence of interteam competition and intrateam coordination causes dual effects, which are captured by an equilibrium analysis of the followers’ game. To align the platform’s interest with workers’ heterogeneous working-time preferences, we propose a profit-maximizing contest scheme consisting of a winner’s reward and time-varying payments. A novel algorithm that combines Bayesian optimization, duality, and a penalty method solves the optimal scheme in the nonconvex equilibrium-constrained problem. Our results indicate that teamwork is a useful strategy with limitations. Under the proposed scheme, team contest always benefits workers. Intrateam coordination helps teams strategically mitigate the negative externalities caused by overcompetition among workers. For the platform, the optimal scheme can direct teams’ schedules toward more profitable market equilibria when workers have inaccurate perceptions of the market. History: This paper has been accepted for the Service Science Special Issue on Innovation in Transportation-Enabled Urban Services. Funding: This work was supported by the National Science Foundation [Grant FW-HTF-P 2222806]. Supplemental Material: The online appendices are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/serv.2023.0320 .