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Research shows that people’s perceptions of historical violence shape many present-day outcomes. Yet it is also plausible that people emphasize or downplay certain events of the past based on how these resonate with their beliefs and identities today. With a population of diverse orientations involving Russia and Europe, Ukraine in 2019 was an important case for exploring how people’s present geopolitical orientations shaped perceptions of victimization in World War II. Drawing on a survey experiment, we find evidence for “motivated reasoning” among Western-oriented respondents, who emphasized their family’s suffering in World War II when faced with information that attributed blame to the Soviet regime. We find no evidence for motivated reasoning among the Russian-oriented respondentsmore » « lessFree, publicly-accessible full text available March 20, 2025
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The Russian invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 has again drawn attention to the geopolitical aims of President Vladimir Putin in the states of the former Soviet Union, the ‘Near Abroad’. While Putin's actions have been widely condemned in the West, the reaction among the former Soviet states has been more mixed. Using representative national surveys from late 2019 - early 2020, the article reports the results of an endorsement experiment to gage the support that Putin had in six countries of the former Soviet space (Ukraine, Moldova, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Georgia and Armenia). Direct questioning about Putin revealed that half of the 8420 respondents said that they had ‘no trust at all’ though views varied a lot by country. Given the sensitivity around perceptions of Putin, an endorsement experiment elicits more accurate results. Five expectations of who supports Putin are tested in models with socio-demographic controls. Respondents with more close-minded personalities show significantly more support for Vladimir Putin, our key test. People who are skeptical of scientific expertise and those with traditional views (measured by a question about patriarchal dominance in marriages) are also more likely to support Putin. In contrast, support for Putin is not significantly greater by those who subscribe to conspiracy theories, and by those with little interest in politics. Country level results are generally in line with the results of the overall model, but demonstrate some interesting variation. Vladimir Putin overall has higher trust and support in Belarus, Armenia, and Kazakhstan than in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova but the respondents in all countries behave in a manner consistent with their personal traits in endorsing or opposing Putin's positions.more » « less
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Collecting public opinion data is challenging in the shadow of war. And yet accurate public opinion is crucial. Political elites rely on it and often attempt to influence it. Therefore, it is incumbent on researchers to provide independent and reliable wartime polls. However, surveying in wartime presents a distinctive set of challenges. We outline two challenges facing polling in war: under-coverage and response bias. We highlight these challenges in the context of the Russia– Ukraine war, drawing on original panel survey data tracing the attitudes of the same people prior to and after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. We conclude with some lessons for those employing survey methods in wartime, and point to steps forward, in Ukraine and beyond.more » « less
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Ukraine is a very large and diverse country, and the least we can do amidst the massive trauma of Russia’s invasion is to acknowledge and respect its socio-cultural and geographic complexity. While there is strong evidence that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shifted public opinion towards the West, researchers have an obligation to convey the difficulties in gathering sensitive survey data in war zones and, thus, temper how data are generalized and represented in public discourse. This requires nuance when discussing the preferences of Ukrainians from all areas, including those in exile or living under Russian control, and greater efforts to communicate uncertainty.more » « less
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null (Ed.)Territory is central to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Borders and control of lands claimed by both Azer- baijan and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic have shifted dramatically since the end of the Soviet Union. Following up on a 2011 survey, we again asked a representative sample of Karabakhis in February 2020 about their territorial aspirations and the possibility of surrendering some lands to Azerbaijan. The results are somewhat contradictory. While about half of the sample were willing to compromise on territory with Azerbaijan—in the expectation of a more permanent and peaceful settlement to the conflict—a firm major- ity (85%) rejected any return to the smaller lands of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast (NKAO) of Soviet times. This result is highly consistent with the 2011 data. Even more respondents than in 2011 aspired to extend Nagorno-Karabakh’s territory to encompass all historical Armenian lands, a patently unre- alistic option. While Karabakhi attitudes remained hardened against territorial compromise, the 2020 war changed the facts on the ground and reduced the Republic’s control to an area even smaller than the NKAOmore » « less