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Solutions to challenging inference problems are often subject to a fundamental trade-off between: 1) bias (being systematically wrong) that is minimized with complex inference strategies, and 2) variance (being oversensitive to uncertain observations) that is minimized with simple inference strategies. However, this trade-off is based on the assumption that the strategies being considered are optimal for their given complexity and thus has unclear relevance to forms of inference based on suboptimal strategies. We examined inference problems applied to rare, asymmetrically available evidence, which a large population of human subjects solved using a diverse set of strategies that varied in form and complexity. In general, subjects using more complex strategies tended to have lower bias and variance, but with a dependence on the form of strategy that reflected an inversion of the classic bias-variance trade-off: subjects who used more complex, but imperfect, Bayesian-like strategies tended to have lower variance but higher bias because of incorrect tuning to latent task features, whereas subjects who used simpler heuristic strategies tended to have higher variance because they operated more directly on the observed samples but lower, near-normative bias. Our results help define new principles that govern individual differences in behavior that depends on rare-event inference and, more generally, about the information-processing trade-offs that can be sensitive to not just the complexity, but also the optimality, of the inference process. 

Working memory, the brain’s ability to temporarily store and recall information, is a critical part of decision making – but it has its limits. The brain can only store so much information, for so long. Since decisions are not often acted on immediately, information held in working memory ‘degrades’ over time. However, it is unknown whether or not this degradation of information over time affects the accuracy of later decisions. The tactics that people use, knowingly or otherwise, to store information in working memory also remain unclear. Do people store pieces of information such as numbers, objects and particular details? Or do they tend to compute that information, make some preliminary judgement and recall their verdict later? Does the strategy chosen impact people’s decision-making? To investigate, Schapiro et al. devised a series of experiments to test whether the limitations of working memory, and how people store information, affect the accuracy of decisions they make. First, participants were shown an array of colored discs on a screen. Then, either immediately after seeing the disks or a few seconds later, the participants were asked to recall the position of one of the disks they had seen, or the average position of all the disks. This measured how much information degraded for a decision based on multiple items, and how much for a decision based on a single item. From this, the method of information storage used to make a decision could be inferred. Schapiro et al. found that the accuracy of people’s responses worsened over time, whether they remembered the position of each individual disk, or computed their average location before responding. The greater the delay between seeing the disks and reporting their location, the less accurate people’s responses tended to be. Similarly, the more disks a participant saw, the less accurate their response became. This suggests that however people store information, if working memory reaches capacity, decision-making suffers and that, over time, stored information decays. Schapiro et al. also noticed that participants remembered location information in different ways depending on the task and how many disks they were shown at once. This suggests people adopt different strategies to retain information momentarily. In summary, these findings help to explain how people process and store information to make decisions and how the limitations of working memory impact their decision-making ability. A better understanding of how people use working memory to make decisions may also shed light on situations or brain conditions where decision-making is impaired. 

Nearly all animals forage to acquire energy for survival through efficient search and resource harvesting. Patch exploitation is a canonical foraging behaviour, but there is a need for more tractable and understandable mathematical models describing how foragers deal with uncertainty. To provide such a treatment, we develop a normative theory of patch foraging decisions, proposing mechanisms by which foraging behaviours emerge in the face of uncertainty. Our model foragers statistically and sequentially infer patch resource yields using Bayesian updating based on their resource encounter history. A decision to leave a patch is triggered when the certainty of the patch type or the estimated yield of the patch falls below a threshold. The time scale over which uncertainty in resource availability persists strongly impacts behavioural variables like patch residence times and decision rules determining patch departures. When patch depletion is slow, as in habitat selection, departures are characterized by a reduction of uncertainty, suggesting that the forager resides in a low-yielding patch. Uncertainty leads patch-exploiting foragers to overharvest (underharvest) patches with initially low (high) resource yields in comparison with predictions of the marginal value theorem. These results extend optimal foraging theory and motivate a variety of behavioural experiments investigating patch foraging behaviour. 

To effectively forage in natural environments, organisms must adapt to changes in the quality and yield of food sources across multiple timescales. Individuals foraging in groups act based on both their private observations and the opinions of their neighbours. How do these information sources interact in changing environments? We address this problem in the context of honeybee colonies whose inhibitory social interactions promote adaptivity and consensus needed for effective foraging. Individual and social interactions within a mathematical model of collective decisions shape the nutrition yield of a group foraging from feeders with temporally switching quality. Social interactions improve foraging from a single feeder if temporal switching is fast or feeder quality is low. When the colony chooses from multiple feeders, the most beneficial form of social interaction is direct switching, whereby bees flip the opinion of nest-mates foraging at lower-yielding feeders. Model linearization shows that effective social interactions increase the fraction of the colony at the correct feeder (consensus) and the rate at which bees reach that feeder (adaptivity). Our mathematical framework allows us to compare a suite of social inhibition mechanisms, suggesting experimental protocols for revealing effective colony foraging strategies in dynamic environments.