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Unlike prior research examining how emoji communicate emotions and modify intended meanings, the present research examined whether emoji can perform specific speech acts (remind, etc.), and how well users are able to accurately assess their ability to do so. In four experiments senders were asked to assume that they would send a specific emoji to perform a certain speech act, or to choose which emoji they would use to perform that speech act. Senders and receivers indicated their judgments of communicative success (i.e., that the receiver would recognize the speech act being performed). In two studies, receivers also made judgments regarding the intended meaning of the emoji. Participants judged receivers to be likely to recognize the intended meaning conveyed with an emoji, and there was some evidence of communicative success. However, participants significantly overestimated communicative success, and in all studies, receivers were more optimistic about communicative success than were senders. 

We examined how people perceive and talk about miscommunication. Participants in study one recalled a miscommunication incident, and then responded to a set of questions regarding their perceptions of the incident. These miscommunications were viewed as relatively unserious, largely the fault of the sender, humorous, confusing and frustrating. Most (76.8%) of the time both interactants were aware of the miscommunication. In a second study we harvested all tweets containing the word “miscommunication” and compared them with tweets containing the word “communication”. Tweets about miscommunication were higher in negative emotionality and certain types of cognitive processing. Hence, the occurrence of miscommunication elicits levels of negative emotions and higher levels of cognition which we interpret as users attempting to make sense of the miscommunication. 

When people use language to communicate, their intended meanings are not always conveyed by words alone. Instead, speakers sometimes convey their meaning in a relatively subtle, or indirect, fashion, and this requires some interpretation on the part of the receiver. In this study we investigated differences between US liberals and conservatives in their interpretation of conversation utterances that have these types of potential indirect meanings. Past research demonstrating cognitive differences between conservatives and liberals suggests liberals should be more likely than conservatives to engage in cognitive processes designed to uncover potential indirect meanings. To test this, we created a conversation between two businessmen that contained five types of indirect utterances that were chosen from the pragmatics literature. Participants were asked to rate the likelihood of an indirect interpretation of each of these utterances, as well as two control utterances that did not convey an indirect meaning. In three studies (TotalN = 664) liberals were significantly more likely to endorse the indirect interpretations of these utterances (but not the control utterances) than were conservatives. Several possible cognitive mediators (Empathy Quotient, Need for Cognition, and Cognitive Flexibility) were examined but did not account for the effect. The results demonstrate an important interactional implication of the cognitive processing differences between liberals and conservatives. Future research should attempt to extend these findings by using different utterances and contexts, as well as examining other potential mediators. 

In this commentary I provide a review of the microaggression construct within a linguistic-pragmatic framework. From this perspective, microaggressions can be viewed as nonconventional indirect speech acts, that is, utterances that, because of their aggressive meaning, require some type of inferential processing on the part of the hearer. This inferential process requires a consideration of the remark in the context within which it occurs, including the prior discourse, as well as the roles and statuses of the interactants. Because microaggressions are indirect, the speaker always has the option, especially if they are higher in power, of denying any aggressive meaning. Focusing on their linguistic/pragmatic features allows for the development of a more principled framework for specifying what constitutes a microaggression, as well as helping to identify the relevant features of the context and the processes involved in the recognition of microaggressions. 

In this commentary I provide a review of the microaggression construct within a linguistic-pragmatic framework. From this perspective, microaggressions can be viewed as nonconventional indirect speech acts, that is, utterances that, because of their aggressive meaning, require some type of inferential processing on the part of the hearer. This inferential process requires a consideration of the remark in the context within which it occurs, including the prior discourse, as well as the roles and statuses of the interactants. Because microaggressions are indirect, the speaker always has the option, especially if they are higher in power, of denying any aggressive meaning. Focusing on their linguistic/pragmatic features allows for the development of a more principled framework for specifying what constitutes a microaggression, as well as helping to identify the relevant features of the context and the processes involved in the recognition of microaggressions. 

Across three experiments we examined cross-cultural differences in the use of emoticons (Experiment 1) and emoji (Experiments 2 and 3) when sending text messages. In all ex- periments, participants wrote text messages to another person based on different hypo- thetical situations (varying in valence or face-threat). We assume that digital CMC cues can serve a face-management function. Hence, based on the assumption that East Asians, relative to Americans, tend to be more concerned with face-management, we expected East Asians to use more emoji and emoticons than Americans, especially in threatening situations. Our results supported our hypotheses: East Asians used significantly more CMC cues overall, and displayed greater situational sensitivity (i.e., used more situationally- congruent CMC cues). Moreover, there were significant, positive correlations between emoji use and scores on collectivism and interdependent self-construal. The preference for emoji use by East Asians does not appear to be a function of poorer English language proficiency; in Experiment 3 there was a significant positive correlation between ESL proficiency and emoji use. We discuss these findings in the context of past cross-cultural communication research as well as politeness theory and face-negotiation theory. 

Across three experiments we examined cross-cultural differences in the use of emoticons (Experiment 1) and emoji (Experiments 2 and 3) when sending text messages. In all experiments, participants wrote text messages to another person based on different hypothetical situations (varying in valence or face-threat). We assume that digital CMC cues can serve a face-management function. Hence, based on the assumption that East Asians, relative to Americans, tend to be more concerned with face-management, we expected East Asians to use more emoji and emoticons than Americans, especially in threatening situations. Our results supported our hypotheses: East Asians used significantly more CMC cues overall, and displayed greater situational sensitivity (i.e., used more situationally-congruent CMC cues). Moreover, there were significant, positive correlations between emoji use and scores on collectivism and interdependent self-construal. The preference for emoji use by East Asians does not appear to be a function of poorer English language ability; in Experiment 3 there was a significant positive correlation between ESL ability and emoji use. We discuss these findings in the context of past cross-cultural communication research as well as politeness theory and face-negotiation theory.