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Abstract Successful language use requires accurate intention recognition. However, sometimes this can be undermined because communication occurs within an interpersonal context. In this research, I used a relatively large set of speech acts (n= 32) and explored how variability in their inherent face‐threat influences the extent to which they are successfully recognized by a recipient, as well as the confidence of senders and receivers in their communicative success. Participants in two experiments either created text messages (senders) designed to perform a specific speech act (e.g., agree) or interpreted those text messages (receivers) in terms of the specific speech act being performed. The speech acts were scaled in terms of their degree of face threat. In both experiments, speech acts that were more threatening were less likely to be correctly recognized than those that were less threatening. Additionally, the messages of the more threatening speech acts were longer and lower in clout than the less threatening speech acts. Senders displayed greater confidence in communicative success than receivers, but judgments of communicative success (for both senders and receivers) were unrelated to actual communicative success. The implications of these results for our understanding of actual communicative episodes are discussed.
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Emoji, Speech Acts, and Perceived Communicative Success
Unlike prior research examining how emoji communicate emotions and modify intended meanings, the present research examined whether emoji can perform specific speech acts (remind, etc.), and how well users are able to accurately assess their ability to do so. In four experiments senders were asked to assume that they would send a specific emoji to perform a certain speech act, or to choose which emoji they would use to perform that speech act. Senders and receivers indicated their judgments of communicative success (i.e., that the receiver would recognize the speech act being performed). In two studies, receivers also made judgments regarding the intended meaning of the emoji. Participants judged receivers to be likely to recognize the intended meaning conveyed with an emoji, and there was some evidence of communicative success. However, participants significantly overestimated communicative success, and in all studies, receivers were more optimistic about communicative success than were senders.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1917631
- PAR ID:
- 10462168
- Publisher / Repository:
- SAGE Publications
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Journal of Language and Social Psychology
- Volume:
- 43
- Issue:
- 1
- ISSN:
- 0261-927X
- Format(s):
- Medium: X Size: p. 83-103
- Size(s):
- p. 83-103
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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