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  1. If a trader could predict price changes in the stock market better than other traders, she would make a fortune. Similarly in the electricity market, a trader that could predict changes in the electricity load, and thus electricity prices, would be able to make large profits. Predicting price changes in the electricity market better than other market participants is hard, but in this paper, we show that attackers can manipulate the electricity prices in small but predictable ways, giving them a competitive advantage in the market. Our attack is possible when the adversary controls a botnet of high wattage devices such as air conditioning units, which are able to abruptly change the total demand of the power grid. Such attacks are called Manipulation of Demand via IoT (MaDIoT) attacks. In this paper, we present a new variant of MaDIoT and name it Manipulation of Market via IoT (MaMIoT). MaMIoT is the first energy market manipulation cyberattack that leverages high wattage IoT botnets to slightly change the total demand of the power grid with the aim of affecting the electricity prices in the favor of specific market players. Using real-world data obtained from two major energy markets, we show that MaMIoTmore »can significantly increase the profit of particular market players or financially damage a group of players depending on the motivation of the attacker.« less
  2. This paper takes a first look at the potential consequences of cyberattacks against structural control systems. We design algorithms and implement them in a testbed and on well-known benchmark models for buildings and bridges. Our results show that attacks to structures equipped with semi-active and active vibration control systems can let the attacker oscillate the building or bridge at the resonance frequency, effectively generating threats to the structure and the people using it. We also implement and test the effectiveness of attack-detection systems.