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Abstract Understanding design processes and behaviors is important for building more effective design outcomes. During design tasks, teams exhibit sequences of actions that form strategies. This article investigates patterns of design actions in a paired parameter design experiment to discover design strategies that influence outcomes. The analysis uses secondary data from a design experiment in which each pair completes a series of simplified cooperative parameter design tasks to minimize completion time. Analysis of 192 task observations uses exploratory factor analysis to identify design strategies and regression analysis to evaluate their impacts on performance outcomes. The article finds that large actions and high action size variability significantly increase completion times, leading to poor performance outcomes. However, results show that frequently changing input controllers within and among designers significantly reduces completion times, leading to higher performance outcomes. Discussion states that larger actions can introduce unexpected errors, while smaller and consistent actions enhance designers’ understanding of the effects of each action, aiding in better planning for subsequent steps. Frequent controller switching reflects effective communication and understanding within design teams, which is crucial for cooperative tasks. 

Abstract Collaboration enables multiple actors with different objectives to work together and achieve a goal beyond individual capabilities. However, strategic uncertainty from partners' actions introduces a potential for losses under failed collaboration relative to pursuing an independent system. The fundamental tradeoff between high‐value but uncertain outcomes from collaborative systems and lower‐value but more certain outcomes for independent systems induces a bistability strategic dynamic. Actors exhibit different risk attitudes that impact decisions under uncertainty which complicate shared understanding of collaborative dynamics. This paper investigates how risk attitudes affect design and strategy decisions in collaborative systems through the lens of game theory. First, an analytical model studies the effect of differential risk attitudes in a two‐actor problem with stag‐hunting strategic dynamics formulated as single‐ and bi‐level games. Next, a simulation model pairs actors with different risk attitudes in a 29‐game tournament based on a prior behavioral experiment. Results show that outcomes collaborative design problems change based on the risk attitudes of both actors. Results also emphasize that considering conservative lower‐level design options facilitates collaboration by providing risk‐averse actors with a safer solution. By accepting that decision‐making actors are not all risk‐neutral, future work seeks to develop new design methods to strengthen the adoption of efficient collaborative solutions. 

Abstract Built infrastructure for water and energy supply, transportation, and other such services underpins human well‐being and socioeconomic development. A fundamental understanding of how infrastructure design and user strategies interact can guide important design decisions as well as policy formulation for ensuring long‐term infrastructure viability in conjunction with improved individual user benefits. In this work, an agent based model (ABM) is developed to study this issue for the specific case of irrigation canals. Cooperatively maintained irrigation canals serve essential roles in sustaining agriculture‐based economies in many regions. Canal system design can strongly affect benefits derived by distributed users, regional agricultural output, and the long‐term viability of the shared infrastructure itself. Here, an ABM is used to investigate how an option to use an independent water source interacts with canal design to affect canal maintenance cooperation and farmer income. The independent water source is stylized as a well that provides access to groundwater and represents astrategically robustdesign option; a design option that reduces the implementer's utility vulnerability to unfavorable actions by other actors. Research in other systems has demonstrated that strategically robust designs can improve both implementer utility and the probability of collaboration. The results of this research, in contrast, demonstrate that the option of individual resource access, the strategically robust design option, as represented by a well, reduces cooperative maintenance in most cases. However, wells also improve farmer income, especially for downstream farmers that are most affected by water theft. 

Abstract This paper evaluates perception of complexity in a novel explanatory model that relates product performance and engineering effort. Complexity is an intermediate factor with two facets: it enables desired product performance but also requires effort to achieve. Three causal mechanisms explain how exponential growth bias, excess complexity, and differential perception lead to effort overruns. Secondary data from a human subject experiment validates the existence of perception of complexity as a context‐dependent factor that influences required design effort. A two‐level mixed effects regression model quantifies differences in perception among 40 design groups. Results summarize how perception of complexity may contribute to effort overruns and outline future work to further validate the explanatory model and causal mechanisms. 

Engineering systems, characterized by their high technical complexity and societal intricacies, require a strategic design approach to navigate multifaceted challenges. Understanding the circumstances that affect strategic action in these systems is crucial for managing complex real-world challenges. These challenges go beyond localized coordination issues and encompass intricate dynamics, requiring a deep understanding of the underlying structures impacting strategic behaviors, the interactions between subsystems, and the conflicting needs and expectations of diverse actors. Traditional optimization and game-theoretic approaches to guide individual and collective decisions need adaptation to capture the complexities of these design ecosystems, particularly in the face of increasing numbers of decision-makers and various interconnections between them. This paper presents a framework for studying strategic decision-making processes in collective systems. It tackles the combinatorial complexity and interdependencies inherent in large-scale systems by representing strategic decision-making processes as binary normal-form games, then dissects and reinterprets them in terms of multiple compact games characterized by two real-numbered structural factors and classifies them across four strategy dynamical domains associated with different stability conditions. We provide a mathematical characterization and visual representation of emergent strategy dynamics in games with three or more actors intended to facilitate its implementation by researchers and practitioners and elicit new perspectives on design and management for optimizing systems-of-systems performance. We conclude this paper with a discussion of the opportunities and challenges of adopting this framework within and beyond the context of engineering systems. 

Understanding design processes and behaviors are important for building more effective design outcomes. During design tasks, teams exhibit sequences of actions that form strategies. This paper investigates patterns of design actions to identify successful design strategies in paired parameter design tasks. The paper uses secondary data from a design experiment in which each pair completes a series of simplified cooperative parameter design tasks to minimize completion time. Analysis of 192 task observations uses principal component analysis to identify design strategies and regression analysis to evaluate their impacts on performance outcomes. Results show that the design strategy of short average action time, small average action size, and low action variation significantly decreases completion time. Discussion of results suggests smaller and more frequent actions provide more rapid feedback about each action to improve communication and understanding between pairs, leading to more efficient design processes. Results show that task order and the number of variables also significantly contribute to performance outcomes, which aligns with past literature. Results also show a negative relationship between lower English ability, experience level, and team performance outcomes. The discussion suggests that lower English ability can be a barrier to communication between pairs, and a lower experience level can decrease the ability to create effective strategies. 

This paper evaluates a questionnaire-based risk attitude assessment method to quantify individual risk attitudes for strategic, multi-actor design decisions. A lottery-equivalence questionnaire elicits a utility curve for risky payoffs which is fit to a Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA) model. Secondary data from a multi-actor design experiment provides observations of strategic decisions in two-actor design games for validation. 124 participants complete the risk attitude questionnaire and a series of 29 experimental tasks. Assuming participants follow the risk dominance equilibrium selection criterion, a risk-neutral utility function accurately predicts 62.2% of decisions. Incorporating risk attitudes elicited from the questionnaire only increases the accuracy to 63.3% while incorporating risk attitudes inferred from observations increases the accuracy to 77.5%. While participants exhibit differential risk attitudes in design tasks, results show the lottery-equivalent questionnaire does not provide risk attitudes consistent with strategic design decisions. Results support findings that risk in the engineering domain is contextual. This paper concludes that risk attitude is an important factor in understanding strategic decisions in interactive engineering design settings and understanding risk attitudes can help create more efficient design processes. 

Abstract Robust designs protect system utility in the presence of uncertainty in technical and operational outcomes. Systems-of-systems, which lack centralized managerial control, are vulnerable to strategic uncertainty from coordination failures between partially or completely independent system actors. This work assesses the suitability of a game-theoretic equilibrium selection criterion to measure system robustness to strategic uncertainty and investigates the effect of strategically robust designs on collaborative behavior. The work models interactions between agents in a thematic representation of a mobile computing technology transition using an evolutionary game theory framework. Strategic robustness and collaborative solutions are assessed over a range of conditions by varying agent payoffs. Models are constructed on small world, preferential attachment and random graph topologies and executed in batch simulations. Results demonstrate that systems designed to reduce the impacts of coordination failure stemming from strategic uncertainty also increase the stability of the collaborative strategy by increasing the probability of collaboration by partners; a form of robustness by environment shaping that has not been previously investigated in design literature. The work also demonstrates that strategy selection follows the risk dominance equilibrium selection criterion and that changes in robustness to coordination failure can be measured with this criterion.