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  1. Free, publicly-accessible full text available June 8, 2026
  2. Free, publicly-accessible full text available February 26, 2026
  3. Randomization has proven to be a good defense against conflictbased side-channel attacks in a shared cache. It improves security by assigning a unique randomization scheme to each security domain, e.g., though a different hashing function. However, if two domains have shared data, the domains must be fused in order to guarantee correctness (i.e., data coherence). Such domain fusion significantly reduces the effectiveness of randomization and weakens its security protection. We propose randomization with sharing (RAWS), which enables secure cross-domain accesses while enforcing cache coherence (and thus data coherence). Based on RAWS, we design a non-fusion based inter-domain coherence protocol (NF-IDCP). NF-IDCP enables cache coherence by looking up and flushing multiple cache lines associated with shared-writable data during their cross-domain accesses. Furthermore, NF-IDCP uses constant-delay banking to securely reduce the latency of the cache line flushes. We also use a secure tag-based filter (STF) to reduce flush costs, for example, by explicitly storing the exact cache locations to be flushed. The security evaluation shows that conflict attacks on the optimized NF-IDCP structures cannot leak conflict observations at a meaningful rate. Attack simulations using CacheFX demonstrate that domain fusion significantly retards the protection provided by randomization schemes. Performance overhead of SPECrate 2017 and PARSEC 3.0 benchmarks is evaluated on ZSim, a microarchitectural simulator. To study the performance impact on realistic workloads, such as Firefox, Chromium and X Server, we use a cache simulator built on top of PANDA, a full-system emulator. Across all configurations, the average performance overhead is less than 5%, and the hardware overhead is less than 3% compared to a domainfused randomization. 
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  4. Fuzzing reliably and efficiently finds bugs in software, including operating system kernels. In general, higher code coverage leads to the discovery of more bugs. This is why most existing kernel fuzzers adopt strategies to generate a series of inputs that attempt to greedily maximize the amount of code that they exercise. However, simply executing code may not be sufficient to reveal bugs that require specific sequences of actions. Synthesizing inputs to trigger such bugs depends on two aspects: (i) the actions the executed code takes, and (ii) the order in which those actions are taken. An action is a high-level operation, such as a heap allocation, that is performed by the executed code and has a specific semantic meaning. ACTOR, our action-guided kernel fuzzing framework, deviates from traditional methods. Instead of focusing on code coverage optimization, our approach generates fuzzer programs (inputs) that leverage our understanding of triggered actions and their temporal relationships. Specifically, we first capture actions that potentially operate on shared data structures at different times. Then, we synthesize programs using those actions as building blocks, guided by bug templates expressed in our domain-specific language. We evaluated ACTOR on four different versions of the Linux kernel, including two well-tested and frequently updated long-term (5.4.206, 5.10.131) versions, a stable (5.19), and the latest (6.2-rc5) release. Our evaluation revealed a total of 41 previously unknown bugs, of which 9 have already been fixed. Interestingly, 15 (36.59%) of them were discovered in less than a day. 
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  5. Fuzzing reliably and efficiently finds bugs in software, including operating system kernels. In general, higher code coverage leads to the discovery of more bugs. This is why most existing kernel fuzzers adopt strategies to generate a series of inputs that attempt to greedily maximize the amount of code that they exercise. However, simply executing code may not be sufficient to reveal bugs that require specific sequences of actions. Synthesizing inputs to trigger such bugs depends on two aspects: (i) the actions the executed code takes, and (ii) the order in which those actions are taken. An action is a high-level operation, such as a heap allocation, that is performed by the executed code and has a specific semantic meaning. ACTOR, our action-guided kernel fuzzing framework, deviates from traditional methods. Instead of focusing on code coverage optimization, our approach generates fuzzer programs (inputs) that leverage our understanding of triggered actions and their temporal relationships. Specifically, we first capture actions that potentially operate on shared data structures at different times. Then, we synthesize programs using those actions as building blocks, guided by bug templates expressed in our domain-specific language. We evaluated ACTOR on four different versions of the Linux kernel, including two well-tested and frequently updated long-term (5.4.206, 5.10.131) versions, a stable (5.19), and the latest (6.2-rc5) release. Our evaluation revealed a total of 41 previously unknown bugs, of which 9 have already been fixed. Interestingly, 15 (36.59%) of them were discovered in less than a day. 
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