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Abstract Human cooperation can be facilitated by the ability to create a mental representation of one’s own actions, as well as the actions of a partner, known as action co-representation. Even though other species also cooperate extensively, it is still unclear whether they have similar capacities. The Joint Simon task is a two-player task developed to investigate this action co-representation. We tested brown capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella), a highly cooperative species, on a computerized Joint Simon task and found that, in line with previous research, the capuchins' performance was compatible with co-representation. However, a deeper exploration of the monkeys’ responses showed that they, and potentially monkeys in previous studies, did not understand the control conditions, which precludes the interpretation of the results as a social phenomenon. Indeed, further testing to investigate alternative explanations demonstrated that our results were due to low-level cues, rather than action co-representation. This suggests that the Joint Simon task, at least in its current form, cannot determine whether non-human species co-represent their partner’s role in joint tasks. 

Abstract Reciprocally patterned behavior is widespread in animals in the wild, but experimental evidence has been frustratingly inconsistent. Contrary to earlier contentions that this inconsistency is because reciprocity in non‐human species is a rare or fragile effect, recent authors have argued that the evidence suggests that reciprocity is widespread, that it often relies on cognitive mechanisms that are common across species, and is potentially an important factor in animals' daily lives. Another possible explanation for its apparent rarity, then, is that due to experimental studies' (intentionally) structured environment, they can lack the appropriate context to promote and support reciprocity. Focusing on outcomes from experimental reciprocal tasks in non‐human primates, I consider several factors that may be important, including the identity of the interactors and their relationship to one another, whether there is free choice of partners, whether the individuals are interacting directly, the timing of the interaction, the commodity involved, whether individuals have a reason to reciprocate, and the equity of the interaction. Clarifying the role of each of these factors will help improve experimental tasks and the social and ecological contexts that promote reciprocity. 

ABSTRACT Social norms – rules governing which behaviours are deemed appropriate or inappropriate within a given community – are typically taken to be uniquely human. Recently, this position has been challenged by a number of philosophers, cognitive scientists, and ethologists, who have suggested that social norms may also be found in certain non‐human animal communities. Such claims have elicited considerable scepticism from norm cognition researchers, who doubt that any non‐human animals possess the psychological capacities necessary for normative cognition. However, there is little agreement among these researchers about what these psychological prerequisites are. This makes empirical study of animal social norms difficult, since it is not clear what we are looking for and thus what should count as behavioural evidence for the presence (or absence) of social norms in animals. To break this impasse, we offer an approach that moves beyond contested psychological criteria for social norms. This approach is inspired by the animal culture research program, which has made a similar shift away from heavily psychological definitions of ‘culture’ to become organised around a cluster of more empirically tractable concepts of culture. Here, we propose an analogous set of constructs built around the core notion of anormative regularity, which we define asa socially maintained pattern of behavioural conformity within a community. We suggest methods for studying potential normative regularities in wild and captive primates. We also discuss the broader scientific and philosophical implications of this research program with respect to questions of human uniqueness, animal welfare and conservation. 

Delayed matching-to-sample (DMTS) tasks are commonly used in the field of comparative cognition to study memory, including working memory. However, specific task demands vary across studies and species, and as such, DMTS tasks may engage different memory systems when features such as the available stimulus pool differ. Further, individual or species-wide differences in response to pressure to perform may increase variation within a species. We explored how task features, memory systems, and pressure interact in tufted capuchin monkeys (Sapajus [Cebus] apella) to influence performance on a DTMS task by varying the size of the possible stimulus pool across testing blocks. We also varied the amount of pressure within a testing block by training monkeys to associate a background color change with a more difficult, but more highly rewarded, trial, as we had done in previous work. In accordance with previous literature (Basile & Hampton, 2013), we found that performance greatly decreased when the possible stimulus pool was limited as compared to a large possible stimulus pool, likely because monkeys could not rely on passive familiarity memory to complete the task. However, we found no overall species tendency to fail under pressure in either the limited- or large-set conditions; instead, we found a surprising tendency to thrive under higher pressure. Taken together, our results further highlight the importance of considering DMTS task features when studying specific memory systems in non-human species and suggest that the DTMS task might not be the best paradigm for testing pressure effects without consideration of individual differences.