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  1. Free, publicly-accessible full text available September 1, 2027
  2. Free, publicly-accessible full text available September 1, 2027
  3. In this article, we study efficient and authorized rewriting of transactions already written to a blockchain. Mutable transactions will make a fraction of all blockchain transactions, but will be a necessity to meet the needs of privacy regulations, such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The state-of-the-art rewriting approaches have several shortcomings, such as lack of user anonymity, inefficiency, and absence of revocation mechanisms for entities authorized to mutate transactions. To address this challenge we present\(\mathsf{ReTRACe}\), an efficient framework for blockchain rewrites.\(\mathsf{ReTRACe}\)is designed by composing a revocable chameleon hash scheme with an ephemeral trapdoor, a revocable fast attribute based encryption scheme, and a dynamic group signature scheme. In this article, (i) we discuss\(\mathsf{ReTRACe}\)and its constituent primitives in detail, (ii) present security analyses of the primitives, and (iii) present experimental results to demonstrate the scalability of\(\mathsf{ReTRACe}\). 
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    Free, publicly-accessible full text available June 30, 2027
  4. Free, publicly-accessible full text available May 24, 2027
  5. Free, publicly-accessible full text available March 2, 2027
  6. Payment channel networks (PCNs) are a promising solution to address blockchain scalability and throughput challenges, However, the security of PCNs and their vulnerability to attacks are not sufficiently studied. In this paper, we introduce SCOOP, a framework that includes two novel congestion attacks on PCNs. These attacks consider the minimum transferable amount along a path (path capacity) and the number of channels involved (path length), formulated as linear optimization problems. The first attack allocates the attacker’s budget to achieve a specific congestion threshold, while the second maximizes congestion under budget constraints. Simulation results show the effectiveness of the proposed attack formulations in comparison to other attack strategies. Specifically, the results indicate that the first attack provides around a 40% improvement in congestion performance, while the second attack offers approximately a 50% improvement in comparison to the state-ofthe- art. Moreover, in terms of payment to congestion efficiency, the first attack is about 60% more efficient, and the second attack is around 90% more efficient in comparison to state-of-the-art. 
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  7. Backdoor attacks pose a significant threat to neural networks, enabling adversaries to manipulate model outputs on specific inputs, often with devastating consequences, especially in critical applications. While backdoor attacks have been studied in various contexts, little attention has been given to their practicality and persistence in continual learning, particularly in understanding how the continual updates to model parameters, as new data distributions are learned and integrated, impact the effectiveness of these attacks over time. To address this gap, we introduce two persistent backdoor attacks–Blind Task Backdoor and Latent Task Backdoor–each leveraging minimal adversarial influence. Our blind task backdoor subtly alters the loss computation without direct control over the training process, while the latent task backdoor influences only a single task’s training, with all other tasks trained benignly. We evaluate these attacks under various configurations, demonstrating their efficacy with static, dynamic, physical, and semantic triggers. Our results show that both attacks consistently achieve high success rates across different continual learning algorithms, while effectively evading state-of-the-art defenses, such as SentiNet and I-BAU. 
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