Search for: All records

To prepare students to use science knowledge in their later personal or professional lives, we must attend to what they believe it means to know and learn science (i.e., epistemology). Unfortunately, we have little understanding of how students' epistemologies shift and are stabilized as they navigate their science courses. Researchers have made intuitive arguments that many microscale epistemological messages sum over time to give rise to macro‐scale understandings of knowing and learning, but we have no theoretical model for how this sum unfolds. Here, we begin to build such a theoretical model. To do so, we focus on assessments and related materials in a college chemistry course as potentially consequential sources of messages about valued knowledge products and processes. We then elicited students' evolving understandings of assessment‐related epistemological messages in several one‐on‐one interviews conducted throughout the semester. Analysis of how three students experienced, negotiated, and responded to assessment‐related messages showed that interactions with the course system stabilized a consistent, well‐resolved picture of the ways of knowing and learning that counted in the focal course. Specifically, good knowledge must have specific authority‐mandated features and knowledge is justified primarily via alignment with an instructor‐authored key. Students found utility in different (reliable) processes for achieving the aim of authorized knowledge, and some of these differences were maintained throughout the semester. Implications for modeling students' experience with course‐embedded epistemological messages over time and how this work might inform practice are discussed. 

Thinking about knowledge and knowing (i.e., epistemic cognition) is an important part of student learning and has implications for how they apply their knowledge in future courses, careers, and other aspects of their lives. Three classes of models have emerged from research on epistemic cognition: developmental models, dimensional models, and resources models. These models can be distinguished by how value is assigned to particular epistemic ideas (hierarchy), how consistent epistemic ideas are across time and/or context (stability), and the degree to which people are consciously aware of their own epistemic ideas (explicitness). To determine the extent to which these models inform research on epistemic cognition in chemistry education specifically, we reviewed 54 articles on undergraduate chemistry students’ epistemologies. First, we sought to describe the articles in terms of the courses and unit of study sampled, the methods and study designs implemented, and the means of data collection utilized. We found that most studies focused on the epistemic cognition of individual students enrolled in introductory chemistry courses. The majority were qualitative and employed exploratory or quasi-experimental designs, but a variety of data collection methods were represented. We then coded each article for how it treated epistemic cognition in terms of hierarchy, stability, and explicitness. The overwhelming majority of articles performed a hierarchical analysis of students’ epistemic ideas. An equal number of articles treated epistemic cognition as stableversusunstable across time and/or context. Likewise, about half of the studies asked students directly about their epistemic cognition while approximately half of the studies inferred it from students’ responses, course observations, or written artifacts. These codes were then used to infer the models of epistemic cognition underlying these studies. Eighteen studies were mostly consistent with a developmental or dimensional model, ten were mostly aligned with a resources model, and twenty-six did not provide enough information to reasonably infer a model. We advocate for considering how models of epistemic cognition—and their assumptions about hierarchy, stability, and explicitness—influence the design of studies on students’ epistemic cognition and the conclusions that can be reasonably drawn from them. 

Compelling evidence, from multiple levels of schooling, suggests that teachers’ knowledge and beliefs about knowledge, knowing, and learning ( i.e. , epistemologies) play a strong role in shaping their approaches to teaching and learning. Given the importance of epistemologies in science teaching, we as researchers must pay careful attention to how we model them in our work. That is, we must work to explicitly and cogently develop theoretical models of epistemology that account for the learning phenomena we observe in classrooms and other settings. Here, we use interpretation of instructor interview data to explore the constraints and affordances of two models of epistemology common in chemistry and science education scholarship: epistemological beliefs and epistemological resources. Epistemological beliefs are typically assumed to be stable across time and place and to lie somewhere on a continuum from “instructor-centered” (worse) to “student-centered” (better). By contrast, a resources model of epistemology contends that one's view on knowledge and knowing is compiled in-the-moment from small-grain units of cognition called resources . Thus, one's epistemology may change one moment to the next. Further, the resources model explicitly rejects the notion that there is one “best” epistemology, instead positing that different epistemologies are useful in different contexts. Using both epistemological models to infer instructors’ epistemologies from dialogue about their approaches to teaching and learning, we demonstrate that how one models epistemology impacts the kind of analyses possible as well as reasonable implications for supporting instructor learning. Adoption of a beliefs model enables claims about which instructors have “better” or “worse” beliefs and suggests the value of interventions aimed at shifting toward “better” beliefs. By contrast, modeling epistemology as in situ activation of resources enables us to explain observed instability in instructors’ views on knowing and learning, surface and describe potentially productive epistemological resources, and consider instructor learning as refining valuable intuition rather than “fixing” “wrong beliefs”.