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Abstract In an adversarial collaboration, two preregistered U.S.‐based studies (totalN = 6181) tested three hypotheses regarding the relationship between political ideology and belief rigidity (operationalized as less evidence‐based belief updating): rigidity‐of‐the‐right, symmetry, and rigidity‐of‐extremes. Across both studies, general and social conservatism were weakly associated with rigidity (|b| ~ .05), and conservatives were more rigid than liberals (Cohen'sd ~ .05). Rigidity generally had null associations with economic conservatism, as well as social and economic political attitudes. Moreover, general extremism (but neither social nor economic extremism) predicted rigidity in Study 1, and all three extremism measures predicted rigidity in Study 2 (average |bs| ~ .07). Extreme rightists were more rigid than extreme leftists in 60% of the significant quadratic relationships. Given these very small and semi‐consistent effects, broad claims about strong associations between ideology and belief updating are likely unwarranted. Rather, psychologists should turn their focus to examining the contexts where ideology strongly correlates with rigidity. 

Humility, the organizing virtue of multicultural frameworks in counseling psychology, has traditionally been framed to be positively associated with health and well-being and negatively associated with mental illness. Despite lauded benefits, however, scholars have cautioned that humility may not always be of benefit. To examine these associations, we conducted a meta-analysis to clarify the magnitude of the associations between humility and physical health, mental illness (i.e., depression, anxiety), life satisfaction, and eudaimonic well-being (i.e., meaning in life, purpose in life), in addition to testing moderators. The final sample included 65 studies, with results yielding small to medium associations (rs ranged from −.06 to .20) between humility and examined outcomes. Results suggest that the size and direction of associations depend on methodological choices and cultural contexts. Implications for studying the cultural context of humility are discussed. 

Not AvailableIntellectual humility (IH) is related to less political and religious polarization, so IH may help shed light on polarization broadly. That said, IH-polarization relations may differ depending on the belief domain or identity in question, which in turn raises important implications for applied work aimed at reducing polarization. Here we simultaneously examined political and religious affective polarization in relation to IH. Across belief domains (politics and religion) and identities (Republicans, Democrats, atheists, Christians), IH was consistently related to less affective polarization. These relations tended to remain significant even when controlling for belief strength. There was limited evidence, however, that IH statistically protected against variables that predict more polarization (e.g. moralization of beliefs). Altogether, these findings highlight pressing directions for future research that can uncover the constellation of variables that might mitigate polarization in those most likely to be polarized. 

When making social judgments, children prefer confidence over uncertainty. At the same time, they also value calibration and accuracy. How, then, do children reason about calibrated uncertainty, or intellectual humility, versus unwarranted confidence, or intellectual arrogance? Here we examined whether 4- to 11-year-olds evaluated intellectually humble individuals as more likable, more knowledgeable, nicer, and smarter than intellectually arrogant individuals. Across two studies involving 229 children (Study 1: N = 111, 59% White, 39% girls; Study 2: N = 118, 66% White, 49% girls), we found that children, by the age of 5.5 years, preferred an intellectually humble over an intellectually arrogant individual, with this preference strengthening over development. Moreover, children preferred intellectual humility over intellectual arrogance both when an intellectually humble individual appeared to be accurate (Study 1) and when it was unclear whether they were accurate (Study 2). Altogether, these findings indicate that children do not prioritize unwarranted confidence more than calibrated uncertainty in their social judgments. We conclude by highlighting pressing directions for future research surrounding what makes children prefer intellectual humility and why. 

Public trust in scientists is critical to our ability to face societal threats. Here, across five pre-registered studies (N = 2,034), we assessed whether perceptions of scientists’ intellectual humility affect perceived trustworthiness of scientists and their research. In study 1, we found that seeing scientists as higher in intellectual humility was associated with greater perceived trustworthiness of scientists and support for science-based beliefs. We then demonstrated that describing a scientist as high (versus low) in intellectual humility increased perceived trustworthiness of the scientist (studies 2–4), belief in their research (studies 2–4), intentions to follow their research-based recommendations (study 3) and information-seeking behaviour (study 4). We further demonstrated that these effects were not moderated by the scientist’s gender (study 3) or race/ethnicity (study 4). In study 5, we experimentally tested communication approaches that scientists can use to convey intellectual humility. These studies reveal the benefits of seeing scientists as intellectually humble across medical, psychological and climate science topics. 

Because an intellectually humble person is neither diffident nor arrogant in their views, intellectual humility (IH) is considered a virtuous mean. Yet, evidence for the virtuous mean account is mixed, with some studies finding evidence for it and some studies finding evidence against it. To clarify these ambiguities, we examined the curvilinear relations between multiple IH conceptualizations and belief strength across political, religious, and irreligious beliefs. In a secondary analysis of more than 4,000 participants, there was evidence for the virtuous mean account for political beliefs, evidence against it for religious beliefs, and little evidence for irreligious beliefs. Altogether, these results raise the possibility that the virtuous mean account of IH is not as generalizable as originally presumed. Thus, instead of asking whether IH is a virtuous mean, future research should ask when, why, and how IH is a virtuous mean for some beliefs and not for others. 

Given the pervasiveness and dangers of misinformation, there has been a surge of research dedicated to uncovering predictors of and interventions for misinformation receptivity. One promising individual differences variable is intellectual humility (IH), which reflects a willingness to acknowledge the limitations of one’s views. Research has found that IH is correlated with less belief in misinformation, greater intentions to engage in evidence-based behaviors (e.g., receive vaccinations), and more actual engagement in evidence-based behaviors (e.g., take COVID-19 precautions). We sought to synthesize this growing area of research in a multi-level meta-analytic review (k = 27, S = 54, ES = 469, N = 33,814) to provide an accurate estimate of the relations between IH and misinformation receptivity and clarify potential sources of heterogeneity. We found that IH was related to less misinformation receptivity for beliefs (r = -.15, 95% CI [-.19, -.12]) and greater intentions to move away from misinformation (r = .13, 95% CI [.06, .19]) and behaviors that move people away from misinformation (r = .30, 95% CI [.24, .36]). Effect sizes were generally small, and moderator analyses revealed that effects were stronger for comprehensive (as opposed to narrow) measures of IH. These findings suggest that IH is one path for understanding resilience against misinformation, and we leverage our results to highlight pressing areas for future research focused on boundary conditions, risk factors, and causal implications. 

Background: A rapidly growing body of research demonstrates that conspiratorial ideation is related to less accuracy, more overconfidence, and more reliance on intuition. Yet, the bulk of this research has focused on belief in conspiracy theories rather than conspiracy theorists. As such it remains unclear whether all conspiracy theorists are equally inaccurate, overconfident, and reliant on intuition or whether there are types of conspiracy theorists who differ across these variables. Methods: To address this gap in the literature, we conducted a preregistered secondary data analysis of the variable-level and person-centered relations among conspiratorial ideation, accuracy, overconfidence, and motivations across five samples (Nsranged from 477 to 3,056). We used multiple measures of each variable to build in conceptual replication. Results: Broadly, the variable-centered results were consistent with existing research and revealed that conspiratorial ideation tended to be related to less accuracy, more overconfidence, more reliance on intuition and closemindedness, and less rational thinking and open-mindedness. In person-centered analyses, we found two classes of individuals, one who scored higher on conspiratorial ideation and one who scored lower. In the conspiracy theorist class, we found that conspiracy theorists were not unknowledgeable and irrational across the board. Conclusions: Thus, conspiracy theorists may be more psychologically complex than originally presumed based on variable-level results. Future research is needed to examine how different motives manifest in conspiracy theorists and to leverage insights from such research to reduce susceptibility to misinformation.