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Because an intellectually humble person is neither diffident nor arrogant in their views, intellectual humility (IH) is considered a virtuous mean. Yet, evidence for the virtuous mean account is mixed, with some studies finding evidence for it and some studies finding evidence against it. To clarify these ambiguities, we examined the curvilinear relations between multiple IH conceptualizations and belief strength across political, religious, and irreligious beliefs. In a secondary analysis of more than 4,000 participants, there was evidence for the virtuous mean account for political beliefs, evidence against it for religious beliefs, and little evidence for irreligious beliefs. Altogether, these results raise the possibility that the virtuous mean account of IH is not as generalizable as originally presumed. Thus, instead of asking whether IH is a virtuous mean, future research should ask when, why, and how IH is a virtuous mean for some beliefs and not for others.
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This content will become publicly available on July 4, 2026
How intellectual humility relates to political and religious polarization
Not AvailableIntellectual humility (IH) is related to less political and religious polarization, so IH may help shed light on polarization broadly. That said, IH-polarization relations may differ depending on the belief domain or identity in question, which in turn raises important implications for applied work aimed at reducing polarization. Here we simultaneously examined political and religious affective polarization in relation to IH. Across belief domains (politics and religion) and identities (Republicans, Democrats, atheists, Christians), IH was consistently related to less affective polarization. These relations tended to remain significant even when controlling for belief strength. There was limited evidence, however, that IH statistically protected against variables that predict more polarization (e.g. moralization of beliefs). Altogether, these findings highlight pressing directions for future research that can uncover the constellation of variables that might mitigate polarization in those most likely to be polarized.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2313708
- PAR ID:
- 10650197
- Publisher / Repository:
- Taylor & Francis
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- The Journal of Positive Psychology
- Volume:
- 20
- Issue:
- 4
- ISSN:
- 1743-9760
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 569 to 581
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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