skip to main content
US FlagAn official website of the United States government
dot gov icon
Official websites use .gov
A .gov website belongs to an official government organization in the United States.
https lock icon
Secure .gov websites use HTTPS
A lock ( lock ) or https:// means you've safely connected to the .gov website. Share sensitive information only on official, secure websites.

Explore Research Products in the PAR
It may take a few hours for recently added research products to appear in PAR search results.


  • Home
  • Search Results
  • Page 1 of 1

Search for: All records

Award ID contains: 2417162

Note: When clicking on a Digital Object Identifier (DOI) number, you will be taken to an external site maintained by the publisher. Some full text articles may not yet be available without a charge during the embargo (administrative interval).
What is a DOI Number?

Some links on this page may take you to non-federal websites. Their policies may differ from this site.

  1. (, Journal of Economic Perspectives)
    The 2024 John Bates Clark Medal of the American Economic Association was awarded to Philipp Strack, Professor of Economics at Yale University, for his pathbreaking contributions to the study of individual decision making, which have introduced new techniques, improved our understanding of important economic phenomena, and helped spark a new wave of research on the economics of information while building bridges between modern economic theory and a wide range of adjacent disciplines. This article summarizes some of Philipp’s papers, and explains how they build on and improve previous work. 
    more » « less
    Free, publicly-accessible full text available February 1, 2026
  2. ; (, American Economic Review: Insights)
    We study community enforcement in a large population with noisy monitoring. We focus on equilibria in the prisoner’s dilemma that are coordination proof, meaning that matched partners never play a Pareto-dominated Nash equilibrium in the one-shot game induced by the equilibrium continuation payoffs at their current histories. We show that a noise-tolerant version of contagion strategies is optimal among all coordination-proof equilibria. Welfare under tolerant contagion strategies decreases in the noise level and the gain from defection faster than welfare in a fixed partnership does. Thus, community enforcement has a comparative advantage in supporting “ low-stakes”relationships. (JEL C72, C73, C78, Z13) 
    more » « less
    Full Text Available