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Biologists often study certain biological systems as models of a phenomenon of interest even if they already know that the phenomenon occurs through diverse mechanisms and hence none of those systems can sufficiently represent it by itself. To understand this modeling practice, the present paper provides an account of how multiple model systems can be used to study a phenomenon whose underlying mechanisms are diverse. Even if generalizability of results from a single model system is significantly limited, generalizations concerning particular aspects of mechanisms often hold across certain ranges of biological systems, which enables multiple model systems to jointly represent such a phenomenon. Comparing mechanisms that operate in different biological systems as examples of the same phenomenon also facilitates characterization and investigation of individual mechanisms. I also compare my account with two existing accounts of the use of multiple model systems and argue that my account is distinct from and complementary to them. 

Taking a cue from remarks Kuhn makes in 1990 about the historical turn in philosophy of science, I examine the history of history and philosophy of science within the British philosophical context of the 1950s and early 1960s when ordinary language philosophy’s influence was at its peak. Specifically, I make the case that the ordinary language philosophers’ methodological recommendation to analyze actual linguistic practice influences several prominent criticisms of the deductive-nomological model of scientific explanation and that these criticisms are related to the historical turn in philosophy of science. I think such connections are especially clear in the work of Stephen Toulmin, who taught at Oxford from 1949 to 1954, and Michael Scriven, who completed a dissertation on explanation under Gilbert Ryle in 1956. I also consider Mary Hesse’s appeal to an ordinary language-influenced account of meaning in her account of the role of models in scientific reasoning. I think there are two upshots to my historical sketch. First, it fills out details of the move away from logical positivism to more historical- and practice-focused philosophies of science. Second, questions about linguistic meaning and the proper targets and aims of philosophical analysis are part and parcel of the historical turn, as well as its reception. 

This paper introduces new empirical methods into the philosophy of science as part of broader naturalization efforts which have been championed by some members of the philosophical community. In the beginning, we defend this approach and present the main reasons why new methods such as empirical conceptual analysis with advanced statistical analysis should be adopted and further developed. Next, we proceed to practical examples of how such empirical analysis can be applied to the concept of objectivity and its current understanding by working scientists, and also to the historical-philosophical notion of Crombie’s styles of scientific thinking and Hacking’s styles of styles of reasoning. In conclusion, we assess the utility and limitations of this new approach, particularly the potential of these qualitative and quantitative methods to produce exact and transparent images of a concept’s use in lay or professional target groups. 

In this paper, I discuss the reception of Kuhn's book on Planck and the quantum. Most criticisms of the book concern, I argue, how to understand Kuhn's notion of a paradigm, and they all read the notion, I claim by means of Joseph Rouse's work, in theory-driven terms. I then show that an alternative reading, in terms of a practice-focused reading of paradigms, is also possible, and is in fact to be preferred, since it is more in line with how Kuhn narrated the quantum-episode, it overcomes most of the criticisms raised against the book, and it allows us to open up new historical-philosophical research directions. 

This paper takes an integrated history and philosophy of science approach to the topic of "simplicity out of complexity". The reflex theory was a framework within early 20th century psychology and neuroscience which aimed to decompose complex behaviours and neural responses into simple reflexes. It was controversial in its time, and did not live up to its own theoretical and empirical ambitions. Examination of this episode poses important questions about the limitations of simplifying strategies, and the relationship between simplification and the engineering approach to biology. 

Ethnobotanical research provides ample justification for comparing diverse biological nomenclatures and exploring ways that retain alternative naming practices. However, how (and whether) comparison of nomenclatures is possible remains a subject of discussion. The comparison of diverse nomenclatural practices introduces a suite of epistemic and ontological difficulties and considerations. Different nomenclatures may depend on whether the communities using them rely on formalized naming conventions; cultural or spiritual valuations; or worldviews. Because of this, some argue that the different naming practices may not be comparable if the ontological commitments employed differ. Comparisons between different nomenclatures cannot assume that either the naming practices or the object to which these names are intended to apply identifies some universally agreed upon object of interest. Investigating this suite of philosophical problems, I explore the role grey nomenclatures play in classification. ‘Grey nomenclatures’ are defined as those that employ names that are either intentionally or accidently non-Linnaean. The classification of the lichen thallus (a symbiont) has been classified outside the Linnaean system by botanists relying on the International Code of Nomenclature for algae, fungi, and plants (ICN). But, I argue, the use of grey names is not isolated and does not occur exclusively within institutionalized naming practices. I suggest, ‘grey names’ also aptly describe nomenclatures employed by indigenous communities such as the Sámi of Northern Finmark, the Sherpa of Nepal, and the Okanagan First Nations. I pay particular attention to how naming practices are employed in these communities; what ontological commitments they hold; for what purposes are these names used; and what anchors the community's nomenclatural practices. Exploring the history of lichen naming and early ethnolichenological research, I then investigate the stakes that must be considered for any attempt to preserve, retain, integrate, or compare the knowledge contained in both academically formalized grey names and indigenous nomenclatures in a way that preserves their source-specific informational content.