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Detection of malicious behavior is a fundamental problem in security. One of the major challenges in using detection systems in practice is in dealing with an overwhelming number of alerts that are triggered by normal behavior (the so-called false positives), obscuring alerts resulting from actual malicious activity. While numerous methods for reducing the scope of this issue have been proposed, ultimately one must still decide how to prioritize which alerts to investigate, and most existing prioritization methods are heuristic, for example, based on suspiciousness or priority scores. We introduce a novel approach for computing a policy for prioritizing alerts using adversarial reinforcement learning. Our approach assumes that the attackers know the full state of the detection system and dynamically choose an optimal attack as a function of this state, as well as of the alert prioritization policy. The first step of our approach is to capture the interaction between the defender and attacker in a game theoretic model. To tackle the computational complexity of solving this game to obtain a dynamic stochastic alert prioritization policy, we propose an adversarial reinforcement learning framework. In this framework, we use neural reinforcement learning to compute best response policies for both the defender and the adversary to an arbitrary stochastic policy of the other. We then use these in a double-oracle framework to obtain an approximate equilibrium of the game, which in turn yields a robust stochastic policy for the defender. Extensive experiments using case studies in fraud and intrusion detection demonstrate that our approach is effective in creating robust alert prioritization policies.
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Get Your Workload in Order: Game Theoretic Prioritization of Database Auditing
A wide variety of mechanisms, such as alert triggers and auditing routines, have been developed to notify administra- tors about types of suspicious activities in the daily use of large databases of personal and sensitive information. However, such mechanisms are limited in that: 1) the volume of such alerts is often substantially greater than the capabilities of resource- constrained organizations and 2) strategic attackers may disguise their actions or carefully choose which records they touch, thus evading auditing routines. To address these problems, we introduce a novel approach to database auditing that explicitly accounts for adversarial behavior by 1) prioritizing the order in which types of alerts are investigated and 2) providing an upper bound on how much resource to allocate for auditing each alert type. We model the interaction between a database auditor and potential attackers as a Stackelberg game in which the auditor chooses an auditing policy and attackers choose which records in a database to target. We further introduce an efficient approach that combines linear programming, column generation, and heuristic search to derive an auditing policy, in the form of a mixed strategy. We assess the performance of the policy selection method using a publicly available credit card application dataset, the results of which indicate that our method produces high-quality database audit policies, significantly outperforming baselines that are not based in a game theoretic framing.
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- PAR ID:
- 10050103
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- International Conference on Data Engineering
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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