Title: Better Than Advertised: Improved Collision-Resistance Guarantees for MD-Based Hash Functions
The MD transform that underlies the MD and SHA families iterates a compression function h to get a hash function H. The question we ask is, what property X of h guarantees collision resistance (CR) of H? The classical answer is that X itself be CR. We show that weaker conditions X, in particular forms of what we call constrained-CR, suffice. This reduces demands on compression functions, to the benefit of security, and also, forensically, explains why collision-finding attacks on compression functions have not, historically, lead to immediate breaks of the corresponding hash functions. We obtain our results via a definitional framework called RS security, and a parameterized treatment of MD, that also serve to unify prior work and variants of the transform. more »« less
Bellare, Mihir; Davis, Hannah; Di, Zijing
(, 26th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography)
Boldyreva, Alexandra; Kolesnikov, Vladimir
(Ed.)
We consider a transform, called Derive-then-Derandomize, that hardens a given signature scheme against randomness failure and implementation error. We prove that it works. We then give a general lemma showing indifferentiability of ShrinkMD, a class of constructions that apply a shrinking output transform to an MD-style hash function. Armed with these tools, we give new proofs for the widely standardized and used $$\EdDSA$$ signature scheme, improving prior work in two ways: (1) we give proofs for the case that the hash function is an MD-style one, reflecting the use of SHA512 in the NIST standard, and (2) we improve the tightness of the reduction so that one has guarantees for group sizes in actual use.
Public key quantum money can be seen as a version of the quantum no-cloning theorem that holds even when the quantum states can be verified by the adversary. In this work, we investigate quantum lightning where no-cloning holds even when the adversary herself gener- ates the quantum state to be cloned. We then study quantum money and quantum lightning, showing the following results: – We demonstrate the usefulness of quantum lightning beyond quan- tum money by showing several potential applications, such as gen- erating random strings with a proof of entropy, to completely decen- tralized cryptocurrency without a block-chain, where transactions is instant and local. – We give Either/Or results for quantum money/lightning, showing that either signatures/hash functions/commitment schemes meet very strong recently proposed notions of security, or they yield quan- tum money or lightning. Given the difficulty in constructing public key quantum money, this suggests that natural schemes do attain strong security guarantees. – We show that instantiating the quantum money scheme of Aaron- son and Christiano [STOC’12] with indistinguishability obfuscation that is secure against quantum computers yields a secure quantum money scheme. This construction can be seen as an instance of our Either/Or result for signatures, giving the first separation between two security notions for signatures from the literature. – Finally, we give a plausible construction for quantum lightning, which we prove secure under an assumption related to the multi- collision resistance of degree-2 hash functions. Our construction is inspired by our Either/Or result for hash functions, and yields the first plausible standard model instantiation of a non-collapsing col- lision resistant hash function. This improves on a result of Unruh [Eurocrypt’16] which is relative to a quantum oracle.
Bellare, Mihir; Lysyanskaya, Anna
(, Journal of Cryptology)
A two-input function is a dual PRF if it is a PRF when keyed by either of its inputs. Dual PRFs are assumed in the design and analysis of numerous primitives and protocols including HMAC, AMAC, TLS 1.3 and MLS. But, not only do we not know whether particular functions on which the assumption is made really are dual PRFs; we do not know if dual PRFs even exist. What if the goal is impossible? This paper addresses this with a foundational treatment of dual PRFs, giving constructions based on standard assumptions. This provides what we call a generic validation of the dual PRF assumption. Our approach is to introduce and construct symmetric PRFs, which imply dual PRFs and may be of independent interest. We give a general construction of a symmetric PRF based on a function having a weak form of collision resistance coupled with a leakage hardcore function, a strengthening of the usual notion of hardcore functions we introduce. We instantiate this general construction in two ways to obtain two specific symmetric and dual PRFs, the first assuming any collision-resistant hash function and the second assuming any one-way permutation. A construction based on any one-way function evades us and is left as an intriguing open problem.
Almeida, José Bacelar; Baritel-Ruet, Cécile; Barbosa, Manuel; Barthe, Gilles; Dupressoir, François; Grégoire, Benjamin; Laporte, Vincent; Oliveira, Tiago; Stoughton, Alley; Strub, Pierre-Yves
(, ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security 2019)
We present a high-assurance and high-speed implementation of the SHA-3 hash function. Our implementation is written in the Jasmin programming language, and is formally verified for functional correctness, provable security and timing attack resistance in the EasyCrypt proof assistant. Our implementation is the first to achieve simultaneously the four desirable properties (efficiency, correctness, provable security, and side-channel protection) for a non-trivial cryptographic primitive. Concretely, our mechanized proofs show that: 1) the SHA-3 hash function is indifferentiable from a random oracle, and thus is resistant against collision, first and second preimage attacks; 2) the SHA-3 hash function is correctly implemented by a vectorized x86 implementation. Furthermore, the implementation is provably protected against timing attacks in an idealized model of timing leaks. The proofs include new EasyCrypt libraries of independent interest for programmable random oracles and modular indifferentiability proofs.
A k-collision for a compressing hash function H is a set of k distinct inputs that all map to the same output. In this work, we show that for any constant k, \Theta(N^(1/2(1-1/(2^k-1)))) quantum queries are both necessary and sufficient to achieve a k-collision with constant probability. This improves on both the best prior upper bound (Hosoyamada et al., ASIACRYPT 2017) and provides the first non-trivial lower bound, completely resolving the problem.
Bellare, Mihir, Jaeger, Joseph, and Len, Julia. Better Than Advertised: Improved Collision-Resistance Guarantees for MD-Based Hash Functions. Retrieved from https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10063403. CCS '17 Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security . Web. doi:10.1145/3133956.3134087.
Bellare, Mihir, Jaeger, Joseph, and Len, Julia.
"Better Than Advertised: Improved Collision-Resistance Guarantees for MD-Based Hash Functions". CCS '17 Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security (). Country unknown/Code not available. https://doi.org/10.1145/3133956.3134087.https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10063403.
@article{osti_10063403,
place = {Country unknown/Code not available},
title = {Better Than Advertised: Improved Collision-Resistance Guarantees for MD-Based Hash Functions},
url = {https://par.nsf.gov/biblio/10063403},
DOI = {10.1145/3133956.3134087},
abstractNote = {The MD transform that underlies the MD and SHA families iterates a compression function h to get a hash function H. The question we ask is, what property X of h guarantees collision resistance (CR) of H? The classical answer is that X itself be CR. We show that weaker conditions X, in particular forms of what we call constrained-CR, suffice. This reduces demands on compression functions, to the benefit of security, and also, forensically, explains why collision-finding attacks on compression functions have not, historically, lead to immediate breaks of the corresponding hash functions. We obtain our results via a definitional framework called RS security, and a parameterized treatment of MD, that also serve to unify prior work and variants of the transform.},
journal = {CCS '17 Proceedings of the 2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security},
author = {Bellare, Mihir and Jaeger, Joseph and Len, Julia},
}
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