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Title: Advances in Human Error, Reliability, Resilience, and Performance. AHFE 2018. Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing
In the fight against hunger, Food Banks must routinely make strategic distribution decisions under uncertain supply (donations) and demand. One of the challenges facing the decision makers is that they tend to rely heavily on their prior experiences to make decisions, a phenomenon called cognitive bias. This preliminary study seeks to address cognitive bias through a visual analytics approach in the decision-making process. Using certain food bank data, interactive dashboards were prepared as an alternative to the customary spreadsheet format. A preliminary study was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the dashboard and results indicated dashboards reduced the amount of confirmation bias.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1718672
NSF-PAR ID:
10066342
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
A Visual Analytics Approach to Combat Confirmation Bias for a Local Food Bank
Volume:
778
Page Range / eLocation ID:
13-23
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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