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Title: A Cooperative Jamming Game in Wireless Networks under Uncertainty
Considered is a multi-channel wireless network for secret communication that uses the signal-to-interference-plus-noise ratio (SINR) as the performance measure. An eavesdropper can intercept encoded messages through a degraded channel of each legitimate transmitter-receiver communication pair. A friendly interferer, on the other hand, may send cooperative jamming signals to enhance the secrecy performance of the whole network. Besides, the state information of the eavesdropping channel may not be known completely. The transmitters and the friendly interferer have to cooperatively decide on the optimal jamming power allocation strategy that balances the secrecy performance with the cost of employing intentional interference, while the eavesdropper tries to maximize her eavesdropping capacity. To solve this problem, we propose and analyze a non-zero-sum game between the network defender and the eavesdropper who can only attack a limited number of channels. We show that the Nash equilibrium strategies for the players are of threshold type. We present an algorithm to find the equilibrium strategy pair. Numerical examples demonstrate the equilibrium and contrast it to baseline strategies.
Authors:
;
Award ID(s):
1901721
Publication Date:
NSF-PAR ID:
10291817
Journal Name:
Security and Privacy in Communication Networks. SecureComm 2020. Lecture Notes
Volume:
335
Page Range or eLocation-ID:
233-254
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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