Stochastic control and non-equilibrium thermodynamics: fundamental limits
We consider damped stochastic systems in a controlled (time-varying) potential and study their transition between specified Gibbs-equilibria states in finite time. By the second law of thermody- namics, the minimum amount of work needed to transition from one equilibrium state to another is the difference between the Helmholtz free energy of the two states and can only be achieved by a reversible (infinitely slow) process. The minimal gap between the work needed in a finite-time transition and the work during a reversible one, turns out to equal the square of the optimal mass transport (Wasserstein- 2) distance between the two end-point distributions times the inverse of the duration needed for the transition. This result, in fact, relates non-equilibrium optimal control strategies (protocols) to gradient flows of entropy functionals via the Jordan-Kinderlehrer-Otto scheme. The purpose of this paper is to introduce ideas and results from the emerging field of stochastic thermodynamics in the setting of classical regulator theory, and to draw connections and derive such fundamental relations from a control perspective in a multivariable setting.
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NSF-PAR ID:
10114183
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IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
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1 to 1
ISSN:
0018-9286
3. The theory of mean field games is a tool to understand noncooperative dynamic stochastic games with a large number of players. Much of the theory has evolved under conditions ensuring uniqueness of the mean field game Nash equilibrium. However, in some situations, typically involving symmetry breaking, non-uniqueness of solutions is an essential feature. To investigate the nature of non-unique solutions, this paper focuses on the technically simple setting where players have one of two states, with continuous time dynamics, and the game is symmetric in the players, and players are restricted to using Markov strategies. All the mean field game Nash equilibria are identified for a symmetric follow the crowd game. Such equilibria correspond to symmetric $\epsilon$-Nash Markov equilibria for $N$ players with $\epsilon$ converging to zero as $N$ goes to infinity. In contrast to the mean field game, there is a unique Nash equilibrium for finite $N.$ It is shown that fluid limits arising from the Nash equilibria for finite $N$ as $N$ goes to infinity are mean field game Nash equilibria, and evidence is given supporting the conjecture that such limits, among all mean field game Nash equilibria, are the ones that are stable fixed points of themore »