Vulnerabilities have a detrimental effect on end-users and enterprises, both direct and indirect; including loss of private data, intellectual property, the competitive edge, performance, etc. Despite the growing software industry and a push towards a digital economy, enterprises are increasingly considering security as an added cost, which makes it necessary for those enterprises to see a tangible incentive in adopting security. Furthermore, despite data breach laws that are in place, prior studies have suggested that only 4% of reported data breach incidents have resulted in litigation in federal courts, showing the limited legal ramifications of security breaches and vulnerabilities.
In this paper, we study the hidden cost of software vulnerabilities reported in the National Vulnerability Database (NVD) through stock price analysis. Towards this goal, we perform a high-fidelity data augmentation to ensure data reliability and to estimate vulnerability disclosure dates as a baseline for estimating the implication of software vulnerabilities. We further build a model for stock price prediction using the NARX Neural Network model to estimate the effect of vulnerability disclosure on the stock price. Compared to prior work, which relies on linear regression models, our approach is shown to provide better accuracy. Our analysis also shows that the effect of vulnerabilities on vendors varies, and greatly depends on the specific software industry. Whereas some industries are shown statistically to be affected negatively by the release of software vulnerabilities, even when those vulnerabilities are not broadly covered by the media, some others were not affected at all.
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Open Source Vulnerability Notification
The use of third-party libraries to manage software complexity can expose open source software projects to vulnerabilities. However, project owners do not currently have a standard way to enable private disclosure of potential security vulnerabilities. This neglect may be caused in part by having no template to follow for disclosing such vulnerabilities. We analyzed 600 GitHub projects to determine how many projects contained a vulnerable dependency and whether the projects had a process in place to privately communicate security issues. We found that 385 out of 600 open source Java projects contained at least one vulnerable dependency, and only 13 of those 385 projects had a security vulnerability reporting process. That is, 96.6% of the projects with a vulnerability did not have a security notification process in place to allow for private disclosure. In determining whether the projects even had contact information publicly available, we found that 19.8% had no contact information publicly available, let alone a security vulnerability reporting process. We suggest two methods to allow for community members to privately disclose potential security vulnerabilities.
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- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10128312
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Bordeleau F., Sillitti A., Meirelles P., Lenarduzzi V. (eds) Open Source Systems. OSS 2019. IFIP Advances in Information and Communication Technology
- Volume:
- 556
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 12-23
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-20883-7_2
