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Sensor networks and IoT systems have been widely deployed in monitoring and controlling system. With its increasing utilization, the functionality and performance of sensor networks and their applications are not the only design aims; security issues in sensor networks attract more and more attentions. Security threats in sensor and its networks could be originated from various sectors: users in cyber space, security-weak protocols, obsolete network infrastructure, low-end physical devices, and global supply chain. In this work, we take one of the emerging applications, advanced manufacturing, as an example to analyze the security challenges in the sensor network. Presentable attacks—hardware Trojan attack, man-in-the-middle attack, jamming attack and replay attack—are examined in the context of sensing nodes deployed in a long-range wide-area network (LoRaWAN) for advanced manufacturing. Moreover, we analyze the challenges of detecting those attacks.
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Combined cyber and physical attacks on the maritime transportation system
For years, there has been discussion about physical security in the maritime transportation system (MTS). That discussion has led to standards, regulations, etc. In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in cyber security in the MTS that has led to discussions about best practices for cyber security. It is likely that many future attacks on the MTS (and other systems) will be multi-modal, including both a cyber and a physical component. As a simple example, hacking into security cameras at a port increases vulnerability to a physical intrusion. Thus, a cyber attack could be a precursor to a physical attack, and in fact the opposite could also be the case. This paper presents scenarios of combined cyber and physical attacks and describes ways to understand their likelihood based on ease of attack and seriousness of potential consequences.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1737857
- PAR ID:
- 10166239
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- NMIOTC Maritime interdiction operations journal
- Volume:
- 18
- ISSN:
- 2241-4371
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 27-37
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
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- The DOI is not currently available.
