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Title: Triplet Fingerprinting: More Practical and Portable Website Fingerprinting with N-shot Learning
Website Fingerprinting (WF) attacks pose a serious threat to users' online privacy, including for users of the Tor anonymity system. By exploiting recent advances in deep learning, WF attacks like Deep Fingerprinting (DF) have reached up to 98% accuracy. The DF attack, however, requires large amounts of training data that needs to be updated regularly, making it less practical for the weaker attacker model typically assumed in WF. Moreover, research on WF attacks has been criticized for not demonstrating attack effectiveness under more realistic and more challenging scenarios. Most research on WF attacks assumes that the testing and training data have similar distributions and are collected from the same type of network at about the same time. In this paper, we examine how an attacker could leverage N-shot learning---a machine learning technique requiring just a few training samples to identify a given class---to reduce the effort of gathering and training with a large WF dataset as well as mitigate the adverse effects of dealing with different network conditions. In particular, we propose a new WF attack called Triplet Fingerprinting (TF) that uses triplet networks for N-shot learning. We evaluate this attack in challenging settings such as where the training and more » testing data are collected multiple years apart on different networks, and we find that the TF attack remains effective in such settings with 85% accuracy or better. We also show that the TF attack is also effective in the open world and outperforms traditional transfer learning. On top of that, the attack requires only five examples to recognize a website, making it dangerous in a wide variety of scenarios where gathering and training on a complete dataset would be impractical. « less
Authors:
; ; ;
Award ID(s):
1816851
Publication Date:
NSF-PAR ID:
10182980
Journal Name:
CCS '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
Page Range or eLocation-ID:
1131 to 1148
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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