- Award ID(s):
- 1816851
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10182980
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- CCS '19: Proceedings of the 2019 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communications Security
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1131 to 1148
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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