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Abstract Transient execution attacks such as Spectre and Meltdown exploit speculative execution in modern microprocessors to leak information via cache side‐channels. Software solutions to defend against many transient execution attacks employ thelfenceserialising instruction, which does not allow instructions that come after thelfenceto execute out‐of‐order with respect to instructions that come before thelfence. However, errors and Trojans in the hardware implementation oflfencecan be exploited to compromise the software mitigations that uselfence. The aforementioned security gap has not been identified and addressed previously. The authors provide a formal method solution that addresses the verification oflfencehardware implementation. The authors also show how hardware Trojans can be designed to circumventlfenceand demonstrate that their verification approach will flag such Trojans as well. The authors have demonstrated the efficacy of our approach using RSD, which is an open source RISC‐V based superscalar out‐of‐order processor.
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Exploring Branch Predictors for Constructing Transient Execution Trojans
Transient execution is one of the most critical features used in CPUs to achieve high performance. Recent Spectre attacks demonstrated how this feature can be manipulated to force applications to reveal sensitive data. The industry quickly responded with a series of software and hardware mitigations among which microcode patches are the most prevalent and trusted. In this paper, we argue that currently deployed protections still leave room for constructing attacks. We do so by presenting transient trojans, software modules that conceal their malicious activity within transient execution mode. They appear completely benign, pass static and dynamic analysis checks, but reveal sensitive data when triggered. To construct these trojans, we perform a detailed analysis of the attack surface currently present in today's systems with respect to the recommended mitigation techniques. We reverse engineer branch predictors in several recent x86_64 processors which allows us to uncover previously unknown exploitation techniques. Using these techniques, we construct three types of transient trojans and demonstrate their stealthiness and practicality.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1850365
- PAR ID:
- 10188671
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- ASPLOS '20: Proceedings of the Twenty-Fifth International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 667 to 682
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3373376.3378526
