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This paper is motivated by economic aspects of fixed initial and operating costs for control of spatially distributed systems. In particular, the paper investigates the possibility of a large number of inexpensive actuating and sensing devices, as an alternative to (a reduced number of) expensive high capacity devices. While such an alternative reduces the fixed initial costs associated with actuators and sensors, it may also lead to increased operating costs resulting from communication requirements between the now-networked actuator-sensor-control units. To simplify the controller architecture, a proportional controller is assumed that amounts to a static output feedback controller. In a network of n actuator-sensor pairs, an all-to-all communication topology results in a fully populated static output feedback matrix with as much as n(n-1) communication links. In addition to a traditional performance index used to obtain the static output feedback gain matrix, this paper proposes a mixed index wherein both the traditional performance index and the number of communication links (representing operating costs associated with information exchange links), are taken into account. As an example, the proposed scheme is applied to a parabolic partial differential equation having four actuator-sensor pairs. The resulting optimization produces a sparse static gain matrix with a communication topology that has half the graph edges of the fully connected case and with essentially the same performance.
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Adaptive detection and accommodation of communication attacks on infinite dimensional systems with multiple interconnected actuator/sensor pairs
The work provides a general model of communication attacks on a networked infinite dimensional system. The system employs a network of inexpensive control units consisting of actuators, sensors and control processors. In an effort to replace a reduced number of expensive high-end actuating and sensing devices implementing an observer-based feedback, the alternate is to use multiple inexpensive actuators/sensors with static output feedback. In order to emulate the performance of the high-end devices, the controllers for the multiple actuator/sensors implement controllers which render the system networked. In doing so, they become prone to communication attacks either as accidental or deliberate actions on the connectivity of the control nodes. A single attack function is proposed which models all types of communication attacks and an adaptive detection scheme is proposed in order to (i) detect the presence of an attack, (ii) diagnose the attack and (iii) accommodate the attack via an appropriate control reconfiguration. The reconfiguration employs the adaptive estimates of the controller gains and restructure the controller adaptively in order to minimize the detrimental effects of the attack on closed-loop performance. Numerical studies on a 1D diffusion PDE employing networked actuator/sensor pairs are included in order to further convey the special architecture of detection and accommodation of networked systems under communication attacks.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1825546
- PAR ID:
- 10195589
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- 2020 American Control Conference (ACC)
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 2673 to 2678
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.23919/ACC45564.2020.9147565
