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1. Architectural Tradeoffs for Long Polynomial Modular Multiplication

   https://doi.org/10.1109/IEEECONF60004.2024.10942651  

   Chiu, Sin-Wei; Parhi, Keshab K (October 2024, IEEE)

   Polynomial multiplication over the quotient ring is a critical operation in Ring Learning with Errors (Ring-LWE) based cryptosystems that are used for post-quantum cryptography and homomorphic encryption. This operation can be efficiently implemented using number-theoretic transform (NTT)-based architectures. Among these, pipelined parallel NTTbased polynomial multipliers are attractive for cloud computing as these are well suited for high throughput and low latency applications. For a given polynomial length, a pipelined parallel NTT-based multiplier can be designed with varying degrees of parallelism, resulting in different tradeoffs. Higher parallelism reduces latency but increases area and power consumption,and vice versa. In this paper, we develop a predictive model based on synthesized results for pipelined parallel NTT-based polynomial multipliers and analyze design tradeoffs in terms of area, power, energy, area-time product, and area-energy product across parallelism levels up to 128. We predict that, for very long polynomials, area and power differences between designs with varying levels of parallelism become negligible. In contrast, areatime product and energy per polynomial multiplication decrease with increased parallelism. Our findings suggest that, given area and power constraints, the highest feasible level of parallelism optimizes latency, area-time product, and energy per polynomial multiplication. 

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2. A High-Level Synthesis Approach to the Software/Hardware Codesign of NTT-Based Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithms

   https://doi.org/10.1109/ICFPT47387.2019.00070  

   Nguyen, Duc Tri; Dang, Viet B.; Gaj, Kris (December 2019, 2019 International Conference on Field-Programmable Technology (ICFPT), Tianjin, China)

   Due to an emerging threat of quantum computing, one of the major challenges facing the cryptographic community is a timely transition from traditional public-key cryptosystems, such as RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography, to a new class of algorithms, collectively referred to as Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). Several promising candidates for a new PQC standard can have their software and hardware implementations accelerated using the Number Theoretic Transform (NTT). In this paper, we present an improved hardware architecture for NTT, with the hardware-friendly modular reduction, and demonstrate that this architecture can be efficiently implemented in hardware using High-Level Synthesis (HLS). The novel feature of the proposed architecture is an original memory write-back scheme, which assists in preparing coefficients for performing later NTT stages, saving memory storage used for precomputed constants. Our design is the most efficient for the case when log2N is even. The latency of our proposed architecture is approximately equal to (N log2(N) +3N)/4 clock cycles. As a proof of concept, we implemented the NTT operation for several parameter sets used in the PQC algorithms NewHope, FALCON, qTESLA, and CRYSTALS-DILITHIUM. 

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3. Rounding in the Rings

   Liu, Feng-Hao; Wang, Zhedong (August 2020, Crypto)

   null (Ed.)

   In this work, we conduct a comprehensive study on establishing hardness reductions for (Module) Learning with Rounding over rings (RLWR). Towards this, we present an algebraic framework of LWR, inspired by a recent work of Peikert and Pepin (TCC ’19). Then we show a search-to-decision reduction for Ring-LWR, generalizing a result in the plain LWR setting by Bogdanov et al. (TCC ’15). Finally, we show a reduction from Ring-LWE to Module Ring-LWR (even for leaky secrets), generalizing the plain LWE to LWR reduction by Alwen et al. (Crypto ’13). One of our central techniques is a new ring leftover hash lemma, which might be of independent interests. 

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4. On Quantum Chosen-Ciphertext Attacks and Learning with Errors

   Alagic, Gorjan; Jeffery, Stacey; Ozols, Maris; Poremba, Alexander (January 2019, Theory of Quantum Computing, Communication, and Cryptography 2019)

   Large-scale quantum computing is a significant threat to classical public-key cryptography. In strong "quantum access" security models, numerous symmetric-key cryptosystems are also vulnerable. We consider classical encryption in a model which grants the adversary quantum oracle access to encryption and decryption, but where the latter is restricted to non-adaptive (i.e., pre-challenge) queries only. We define this model formally using appropriate notions of ciphertext indistinguishability and semantic security (which are equivalent by standard arguments) and call it QCCA1 in analogy to the classical CCA1 security model. Using a bound on quantum random-access codes, we show that the standard PRF- and PRP-based encryption schemes are QCCA1-secure when instantiated with quantum-secure primitives. We then revisit standard IND-CPA-secure Learning with Errors (LWE) encryption and show that leaking just one quantum decryption query (and no other queries or leakage of any kind) allows the adversary to recover the full secret key with constant success probability. In the classical setting, by contrast, recovering the key uses a linear number of decryption queries, and this is optimal. The algorithm at the core of our attack is a (large-modulus version of) the well-known Bernstein-Vazirani algorithm. We emphasize that our results should *not* be interpreted as a weakness of these cryptosystems in their stated security setting (i.e., post-quantum chosen-plaintext secrecy). Rather, our results mean that, if these cryptosystems are exposed to chosen-ciphertext attacks (e.g., as a result of deployment in an inappropriate real-world setting) then quantum attacks are even more devastating than classical ones. 

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5. Horizontal Side-Channel Vulnerabilities of Post-Quantum Key Exchange and Encapsulation Protocols

   https://doi.org/10.1145/3476799  

   Aydin, Furkan; Aysu, Aydin; Tiwari, Mohit; Gerstlauer, Andreas; Orshansky, Michael (November 2021, ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems)

   Key exchange protocols and key encapsulation mechanisms establish secret keys to communicate digital information confidentially over public channels. Lattice-based cryptography variants of these protocols are promising alternatives given their quantum-cryptanalysis resistance and implementation efficiency. Although lattice cryptosystems can be mathematically secure, their implementations have shown side-channel vulnerabilities. But such attacks largely presume collecting multiple measurements under a fixed key, leaving the more dangerous single-trace attacks unexplored. This article demonstrates successful single-trace power side-channel attacks on lattice-based key exchange and encapsulation protocols. Our attack targets both hardware and software implementations of matrix multiplications used in lattice cryptosystems. The crux of our idea is to apply a horizontal attack that makes hypotheses on several intermediate values within a single execution all relating to the same secret, and to combine their correlations for accurately estimating the secret key. We illustrate that the design of protocols combined with the nature of lattice arithmetic enables our attack. Since a straightforward attack suffers from false positives, we demonstrate a novel extend-and-prune procedure to recover the key by following the sequence of intermediate updates during multiplication. We analyzed two protocols, Frodo and FrodoKEM , and reveal that they are vulnerable to our attack. We implement both stand-alone hardware and RISC-V based software realizations and test the effectiveness of the proposed attack by using concrete parameters of these protocols on physical platforms with real measurements. We show that the proposed attack can estimate secret keys from a single power measurement with over 99% success rate. 

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