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Title: adPerf: Characterizing the Performance of Third-party Ads
Monetizing websites and web apps through online advertising is widespread in the web ecosystem, creating a billion-dollar market. This has led to the emergence of a vast network of tertiary ad providers and ad syndication to facilitate this growing market. Nowadays, the online advertising ecosystem forces publishers to integrate ads from these third-party domains. On the one hand, this raises several privacy and security concerns that are actively being studied in recent years. On the other hand, the ability of today's browsers to load dynamic web pages with complex animations and Javascript has also transformed online advertising. This can have a significant impact on webpage performance. The latter is a critical metric for optimization since it ultimately impacts user satisfaction. Unfortunately, there are limited literature studies on understanding the performance impacts of online advertising which we argue is as important as privacy and security. In this paper, we apply an in-depth and first-of-a-kind performance evaluation of web ads. Unlike prior efforts that rely primarily on adblockers, we perform a fine-grained analysis on the web browser's page loading process to demystify the performance cost of web ads. We aim to characterize the cost by every component of an ad, so the publisher, ad syndicate, and advertiser can improve the ad's performance with detailed guidance. For this purpose, we develop a tool, adPerf, for the Chrome browser that classifies page loading workloads into ad-related and main-content at the granularity of browser activities. Our evaluations show that online advertising entails more than 15% of browser page loading workload and approximately 88% of that is spent on JavaScript. On smartphones, this additional cost of ads is 7% lower since mobile pages include fewer and well-optimized ads. We also track the sources and delivery chain of web ads and analyze performance considering the origin of the ad contents. We observe that 2 of the well-known third-party ad domains contribute to 35% of the ads performance cost and surprisingly, top news websites implicitly include unknown third-party ads which in some cases build up to more than 37% of the ads performance cost.  more » « less
Award ID(s):
1939237
NSF-PAR ID:
10217204
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Proceedings of the ACM on Measurement and Analysis of Computing Systems
Volume:
5
Issue:
1
ISSN:
2476-1249
Page Range / eLocation ID:
1 to 26
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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