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1. Online revenue maximization for server pricing

   https://doi.org/10.1007/s10458-022-09544-y  

   Boodaghians, Shant; Fusco, Federico; Leonardi, Stefano; Mansour, Yishay; Mehta, Ruta (April 2022, Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems)

   Abstract Efficient and truthful mechanisms to price resources on servers/machines have been the subject of much work in recent years due to the importance of the cloud market. This paper considers revenue maximization in the online stochastic setting with non-preemptive jobs and a unit capacity server. One agent/job arrives at every time step, with parameters drawn from the underlying distribution. We design a posted-price mechanism which can be efficiently computed and is revenue-optimal in expectation and in retrospect, up to additive error. The prices are posted prior to learning the agent’s type, and the computed pricing scheme is deterministic, depending only on the length of the allotted time interval and on the earliest time the server is available. We also prove that the proposed pricing strategy is robust to imprecise knowledge of the job distribution and that a distribution learned from polynomially many samples is sufficient to obtain a near-optimal truthful pricing strategy. 

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2. The I.I.D. Prophet Inequality with Limited Flexibility

   https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.2022.0345  

   Perez-Salazar, Sebastian; Singh, Mohit; Toriello, Alejandro (January 2025, Mathematics of Operations Research)

   In online sales, sellers usually offer each potential buyer a posted price in a take-it-or-leave fashion. Buyers can sometimes see posted prices faced by other buyers, and changing the price frequently could be considered unfair. The literature on posted-price mechanisms and prophet inequality problems has studied the two extremes of pricing policies, the fixed-price policy and fully dynamic pricing. The former is suboptimal in revenue but is perceived as fairer than the latter. This work examines the middle situation, where there are at most k distinct prices over the selling horizon. Using the framework of prophet inequalities with independent and identically distributed random variables, we propose a new prophet inequality for strategies that use at most k thresholds. We present asymptotic results in k and results for small values of k. For k = 2 prices, we show an improvement of at least 11% over the best fixed-price solution. Moreover, k = 5 prices suffice to guarantee almost 99% of the approximation factor obtained by a fully dynamic policy that uses an arbitrary number of prices. From a technical standpoint, we use an infinite-dimensional linear program in our analysis; this formulation could be of independent interest to other online selection problems. 

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3. An O(log n)-Competitive Posted-Price Algorithm for Online Matching on the Line

   Arndt, Stephen; Ascher, Josh; Pruhs, Kirk (December 2023, Springer)

   Motivated by demand-responsive parking pricing systems, we consider posted-price algorithms for the online metric matching prob- lem. We give an O(log n)-competitive posted-price randomized algorithm in the case that the metric space is a line. In particular, in this setting we show how to implement the ubiquitous guess-and-double technique using prices. 

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4. Simple, Credible, and Approximately-Optimal Auctions

   Daskalakis, C; Fishelson, M; Lucier, B; Syrgkanis, V; Velusamy, S (January 2020, 21st ACM Conference on Economics and Computation, EC 2020)

   null (Ed.)

   We identify the first static credible mechanism for multi-item additive auctions that achieves a constant factor of the optimal revenue. This is one instance of a more general framework for designing two-part tariff auctions, adapting the duality framework of Cai et al [CDW16]. Given a (not necessarily incentive compatible) auction format A satisfying certain technical conditions, our framework augments the auction with a personalized entry fee for each bidder, which must be paid before the auction can be accessed. These entry fees depend only on the prior distribution of bidder types, and in particular are independent of realized bids. Our framework can be used with many common auction formats, such as simultaneous first-price, simultaneous second-price, and simultaneous all-pay auctions. If all-pay auctions are used, we prove that the resulting mechanism is credible in the sense that the auctioneer cannot benefit by deviating from the stated mechanism after observing agent bids. If second-price auctions are used, we obtain a truthful O(1)-approximate mechanism with fixed entry fees that are amenable to tuning via online learning techniques. Our results for first price and all-pay are the first revenue guarantees of non-truthful mechanisms in multi-dimensional environments; an open question in the literature [RST17]. 

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5. The Power of Opaque Products in Pricing

   https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3750  

   Elmachtoub, Adam N.; Hamilton, Michael L. (August 2021, Management Science)

   null (Ed.)

   We study the power of selling opaque products, that is, products where a feature (such as color) is hidden from the customer until after purchase. Opaque products, which are sold with a price discount, have emerged as a powerful vehicle to increase revenue for many online retailers and service providers that offer horizontally differentiated items. In the opaque selling models we consider, all of the items are sold at a single common price alongside opaque products that may correspond to various subsets of the items. We consider two types of customers, risk-neutral ones, who assume they will receive a truly random item of the opaque product, and pessimistic ones, who assume they will receive their least favorite item of the opaque product. We benchmark opaque selling against two common selling strategies: discriminatory pricing, where one explicitly charges different prices for each item, and single pricing, where a single price is charged for all the items. We give a sharp characterization of when opaque selling outperforms discriminatory pricing; namely, this result holds for situations where all customers are pessimistic or the item valuations are supported on two points. In the latter case, we also show that opaque selling with just one opaque product guarantees at least 71.9% of the revenue from discriminatory pricing. We then provide upper bounds on the potential revenue increase from opaque selling strategies over single pricing and describe cases where the increase can be significantly more than that of discriminatory pricing. Finally, we provide pricing algorithms and conduct an extensive numerical study to assess the power of opaque selling for a variety valuation distributions and model extensions. This paper was accepted by Gabriel Weintraub, revenue management and market analytics. 

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