People naturally bring their prior beliefs to bear on how they interpret the new information, yet few formal models exist for accounting for the influence of users' prior beliefs in interactions with data presentations like visualizations. We demonstrate a Bayesian cognitive model for understanding how people interpret visualizations in light of prior beliefs and show how this model provides a guide for improving visualization evaluation. In a first study, we show how applying a Bayesian cognition model to a simple visualization scenario indicates that people's judgments are consistent with a hypothesis that they are doing approximate Bayesian inference. In a second study, we evaluate how sensitive our observations of Bayesian behavior are to different techniques for eliciting people subjective distributions, and to different datasets. We find that people don't behave consistently with Bayesian predictions for large sample size datasets, and this difference cannot be explained by elicitation technique. In a final study, we show how normative Bayesian inference can be used as an evaluation framework for visualizations, including of uncertainty.
more »
« less
Belief polarization in a complex world: A learning theory perspective
We present two models of how people form beliefs that are based on machine learning theory. We illustrate how these models give insight into observed human phenomena by showing how polarized beliefs can arise even when people are exposed to almost identical sources of information. In our first model, people form beliefs that are deterministic functions that best fit their past data (training sets). In that model, their inability to form probabilistic beliefs can lead people to have opposing views even if their data are drawn from distributions that only slightly disagree. In the second model, people pay a cost that is increasing in the complexity of the function that represents their beliefs. In this second model, even with large training sets drawn from exactly the same distribution, agents can disagree substantially because they simplify the world along different dimensions. We discuss what these models of belief formation suggest for improving people’s accuracy and agreement.
more » « less- PAR ID:
- 10225699
- Publisher / Repository:
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Volume:
- 118
- Issue:
- 19
- ISSN:
- 0027-8424
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- Article No. e2010144118
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
More Like this
-
-
more » « less
Abstract People think that they see things as they are in “objective reality,” and they impute bias and other negative qualities to those who disagree. Evidence for these tendencies initially emerged in the domain of politics, where people tend to assume that there are objectively correct beliefs and positions. The present research shows that people are confident in the correctness of their views, and they negatively judge those who disagree, even in the seemingly “subjective” domain of art. Across seven experiments, participants evaluated paintings and encountered others who agreed or disagreed with their evaluations. Participants saw others' evaluations as less objective when they clashed with their own, and as more influenced by biasing factors like conformity or financial incentives. These aesthetic preferences felt as objective as political preferences. Reminding people of their belief that artistic preferences are “matters of opinion” reduced this thinking, but did not eliminate it. These findings suggest that people's convictions of their own objectivity are so powerful as to extend to domains that are typically regarded as “subjective.”
-
more » « less
Double consciousness arises from a conflict between the negative appraisals of others and one’s own positive self-appraisal. In this study, we link double consciousness with racialized status beliefs, or beliefs about the competency and worth of group members. Using first-order and generalized second-order evaluations of explicit status beliefs, we examine the consistency between how individuals view their own racial group and how they perceive their group to be viewed by others. Drawing on survey data, we find high agreement in generalized second-order status beliefs among racial groups but misalignment between these evaluations and first-order status beliefs for marginalized groups. Black and Hispanic respondents exhibit double consciousness by rating their racial group as higher status than they understand most people to rate their group. The widespread existence of double consciousness in status beliefs has troubling implications for the development of racial identity among people of color and for equity.
-
Theory of Mind enables us to represent and reason about other people's mental states like beliefs and knowledge. By considering what other people know, this allows us to strategically construct believable lies. Previous work has shown that people construct lies to be consistent with others' beliefs even when those beliefs differ from their own. However, in most real world cases, we don't know everything that the other person knows. We propose that to produce believable lies, the sender considers what private information the receiver may have. Here, we develop our theory into a computational model and test it in a novel paradigm that allows us to distinguish between knowledge shared between the lie sender and receiver and knowledge private to the receiver. Our main model successfully captures how people lie in this paradigm over alternative models. Overall, our work furthers our understanding of human social cognition in adversarial situations.more » « less
-
more » « less
Even though neighborhoods are built for people, lots of wild animals also call these places home. You might have seen a squirrel, a fox, or a deer munching on your garden or running down your street. Living near people gives some animals food and places to live, but it can also cause problems for both animals and people. Sometimes people do not agree about what to do about the animals that live near them. We were curious about how people and wild animals live together and decided to investigate. We studied how people make decisions about deer in the suburbs of Massachusetts, where some people think there are too many deer and others are not so sure. We discovered that people often disagree, and politics matters. Paying attention to this disagreement can help people work together and make choices that let wild animals and people to live together with fewer problems.
