Most results in revenue-maximizing mechanism design hinge on “getting the price right”—selling goods to bidders at prices low enough to encourage a sale but high enough to garner nontrivial revenue. This approach is difficult to implement when the seller has little or no a priori information about bidder valuations or when the setting is sufficiently complex, such as matching markets with heterogeneous goods. In this paper, we apply a robust approach to designing auctions for revenue. Instead of relying on prior knowledge regarding bidder valuations, we “let the market do the work” and let prices emerge from competition for scarce goods. We analyze the revenue guarantees of one of the simplest imaginable implementations of this idea: first, we enhance competition in the market by increasing demand (or alternatively, by limiting supply), and second, we run a standard second price (Vickrey) auction. In their renowned work from 1996 , Bulow and Klemperer [Bulow J, Klemperer P (1996) Auctions vs. negotiations. Amer. Econom. Rev. 86(1):180–194.] apply this method to markets with single goods. As our main result, we give the first application beyond single-parameter settings, proving that, simultaneously for many valuation distributions, this method achieves expected revenue at least as good as the optimal revenue in the original market. Our robust and simple approach provides a handle on the elusive optimal revenue in multiitem matching markets and shows when the use of welfare-maximizing Vickrey auctions is justified, even if revenue is a priority. By establishing quantitative tradeoffs, our work provides guidelines for a seller in choosing among two different revenue-extracting strategies: sophisticated pricing based on market research or advertising to draw additional bidders.
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Countering the winner's curse: Optimal auction design in a common value model
We characterize revenue maximizing mechanisms in a common value environment where the value of the object is equal to the highest of the bidders' independent signals. If the revenue maximizing solution is to sell the object with probability 1, then an optimal mechanism is simply a posted price, namely, the highest price such that every type of every bidder is willing to buy the object. If the object is optimally sold with probability less than 1, then optimal mechanisms skew the allocation toward bidders with lower signals. The resulting allocation induces a “winner's blessing,” whereby the expected value conditional on winning is higher than the unconditional expectation. By contrast, standard auctions that allocate to the bidder with the highest signal (e.g., the first‐price, second‐price, or English auctions) deliver lower revenue because of the winner's curse generated by the allocation. Our qualitative results extend to more general common value environments with a strong winner's curse.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1459899
- PAR ID:
- 10230508
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Theoretical Economics
- Volume:
- 15
- Issue:
- 4
- ISSN:
- 1933-6837
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 1399 to 1434
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.3982/TE3797
