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Multi-agent systems provide a basis for developing systems of autonomous entities and thus find application in a variety of domains. We consider a setting where not only the member agents are adaptive but also the multi-agent system viewed as an entity in its own right is adaptive. Specifically, the social structure of a multi-agent system can be reflected in the social norms among its members. It is well recognized that the norms that arise in society are not always beneficial to its members. We focus on prosocial norms, which help achieve positive outcomes for society and often provide guidance to agents to act in a manner that takes into account the welfare of others. Specifically, we propose Cha, a framework for the emergence of prosocial norms. Unlike previous norm emergence approaches, Cha supports continual change to a system (agents may enter and leave) and dynamism (norms may change when the environment changes). Importantly, Cha agents incorporate prosocial decision-making based on inequity aversion theory, reflecting an intuition of guilt arising from being antisocial. In this manner, Cha brings together two important themes in prosociality: decision-making by individuals and fairness of system-level outcomes. We demonstrate via simulation that Cha can improve aggregate societal gains and fairness of outcomes.
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Predicting social tipping and norm change in controlled experiments
The ability to predict when societies will replace one social norm for another can have significant implications for welfare, especially when norms are detrimental. A popular theory poses that the pressure to conform to social norms creates tipping thresholds which, once passed, propel societies toward an alternative state. Predicting when societies will reach a tipping threshold, however, has been a major challenge because of the lack of experimental data for evaluating competing models. We present evidence from a large-scale laboratory experiment designed to test the theoretical predictions of a threshold model for social tipping and norm change. In our setting, societal preferences change gradually, forcing individuals to weigh the benefit from deviating from the norm against the cost from not conforming to the behavior of others. We show that the model correctly predicts in 96% of instances when a society will succeed or fail to abandon a detrimental norm. Strikingly, we observe widespread persistence of detrimental norms even when individuals determine the cost for nonconformity themselves as they set the latter too high. Interventions that facilitate a common understanding of the benefits from change help most societies abandon detrimental norms. We also show that instigators of change tend to be more risk tolerant and to dislike conformity more. Our findings demonstrate the value of threshold models for understanding social tipping in a broad range of social settings and for designing policies to promote welfare.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1658952
- PAR ID:
- 10274309
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences
- Volume:
- 118
- Issue:
- 16
- ISSN:
- 0027-8424
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- e2014893118
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2014893118
