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This paper investigates the dynamics of systemic risk in banking networks by analyzing equilibrium points and stability conditions. The focus is on a model that incorporates interactions among distressed and undistressed banks. The equilibrium points are determined by solving a reduced system of equations, considering both homogeneous and heterogeneous scenarios. Local and global stability analyses reveal conditions under which equilibrium points are stable or unstable. Numerical simulations further illustrate the dynamics of systemic risk, while the theoretical findings offer insights into the behavior of distressed banks under varying conditions. Overall, the model enhances our understanding of systemic financial risk and offers valuable insights for risk management and policymaking in the banking sector.
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Systemic Risk in Financial Networks: A Survey
We provide an overview of the relationship between financial networks and systemic risk. We present a taxonomy of different types of systemic risk, differentiating between direct externalities between financial organizations (e.g., defaults, correlated portfolios, fire sales), and perceptions and feedback effects (e.g., bank runs, credit freezes). We also discuss optimal regulation and bailouts, measurements of systemic risk and financial centrality, choices by banks regarding their portfolios and partnerships, and the changing nature of financial networks.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2018554
- PAR ID:
- 10287894
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Annual Review of Economics
- Volume:
- 13
- Issue:
- 1
- ISSN:
- 1941-1383
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 171 to 202
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-economics-083120-111540
