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This paper proposes a simple and fast technique for power device open circuit (OC) fault detection in stacked multicell converters (SMCs). A mitigation technique allowing for fault-tolerant operation using a simple front-end routing circuit is also proposed for SMCs. The fault detection concept only needs to sense the voltage and direction of current at the output terminal of the SMC to detect and localize an OC switch fault to a particular rail of the SMC. The proposed technique compares the measured and expected voltage levels considering the commanded switch states and the direction of the terminal current flow. Once an OC fault is detected and localized, the front-end routing circuit will be activated to reconfigure the SMC converter to a simple flying capacitor multilevel converter (FCMC) to maintain the output power flow with a reduced number of voltage levels. A window detector circuit is proposed to track the output voltage level and current direction with high bandwidth. Simulations were performed to validate the fault detection method and router performance. The functionality of windows detector is investigated with a hardware prototype 7 level 300 V SMC.
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RedPlane: enabling fault-tolerant stateful in-switch applications
Many recent efforts have demonstrated the performance benefits of running datacenter functions (e.g., NATs, load balancers, monitoring) on programmable switches. However, a key missing piece remains: fault tolerance. This is especially critical as the network is no longer stateless and pure endpoint recovery does not suffice. In this paper, we design and implement RedPlane, a fault-tolerant state store for stateful in-switch applications. This provides in-switch applications consistent access to their state, even if the switch they run on fails or traffic is rerouted to an alternative switch. We address key challenges in devising a practical, provably correct replication protocol and implementing it in the switch data plane. Our evaluations show that RedPlane incurs negligible overhead and enables end-to-end applications to rapidly recover from switch failures.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1700521
- PAR ID:
- 10287924
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Proceedings of the 2021 ACM SIGCOMM 2021 Conference
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 223 to 244
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3452296.3472905
