Internet of Things (IoT) devices have been increasingly integrated into our daily life. However, such smart devices suffer a broad attack surface. Particularly, attacks targeting the device software at runtime are challenging to defend against if IoT devices use resource-constrained microcontrollers (MCUs). TrustZone-M, a TrustZone extension for MCUs, is an emerging security technique fortifying MCU based IoT devices. This paper presents the first security analysis of potential software security issues in TrustZone-M enabled MCUs. We explore the stack-based buffer overflow (BOF) attack for code injection, return-oriented programming (ROP) attack, heap-based BOF attack, format string attack, and attacks against Non-secure Callable (NSC) functions in the context of TrustZone-M. We validate these attacks using the Microchip SAM L11 MCU, which uses the ARM Cortex-M23 processor with the TrustZone-M technology. Strategies to mitigate these software attacks are also discussed.
SIC 2 : Securing Microcontroller Based IoT Devices with Low-cost Crypto Coprocessors
In this paper, we explore the use of microcontrollers (MCUs) and crypto coprocessors to secure IoT applications, and show how developers may implement a low-cost platform that provides protects private keys against software attacks. We first demonstrate the plausibility of format string attacks on the ESP32, a popular MCU from Espressif that uses the Harvard architecture. The format string attacks can be used to remotely steal private keys hard-coded in the firmware. We then present a framework termed SIC 2 (Securing IoT with Crypto Coprocessors), for secure key provisioning that protects end users' private keys from both software attacks and untrustworthy manufacturers. As a proof of concept, we pair the ESP32 with the low-cost ATECC608A cryptographic coprocessor by Microchip and connect to Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Amazon Elastic Container Service (EC2) using a hardware-protected private key, which provides the security features of TLS communication including authentication, encryption and integrity. We have developed a prototype and performed extensive experiments to show that the ATECC608A crypto chip may significantly reduce the TLS handshake time by as much as 82% with the remote server, and it may lower the total energy consumption of the system by up to 70%. Our results indicate more »
- Award ID(s):
- 1915780
- Publication Date:
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10291810
- Journal Name:
- 2020 IEEE 26th International Conference on Parallel and Distributed Systems (ICPADS)
- Page Range or eLocation-ID:
- 372 to 381
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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