The Internet enables users to access vast resources, but it can also expose users to harmful cyber-attacks. It is imperative that users be informed about a security incident in a timely manner in order to make proper decisions. Visualization of security threats and warnings is one of the effective ways to inform users. However, visual cues are not always accessible to all users, and in particular, those with visual impairments. This late-breaking-work paper hypothesizes that the use of proper sounds in conjunction with visual cues can better represent security alerts to all users. Toward our research goal to validate this hypothesis, we first describe a methodology, referred to as sonification, to effectively design and develop auditory cyber-security threat indicators to warn users about cyber-attacks. Next, we present a case study, along with the results, of various types of usability testing conducted on a number of Internet users who are visually impaired. The presented concept can be viewed as a general framework for the creation and evaluation of human factor interactions with sounds in a cyber-space domain. The paper concludes with a discussion of future steps to enhance this work.
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Socioeconomic threats are more salient to farmers than environmental threats
- Award ID(s):
- 1735095
- PAR ID:
- 10294319
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Journal of Rural Studies
- Volume:
- 86
- Issue:
- C
- ISSN:
- 0743-0167
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 508 to 517
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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