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Assortment optimization finds many important applications in both brick-and-mortar and online retailing. Decision makers select a subset of products to offer to customers from a universe of substitutable products, based on the assumption that customers purchase according to a Markov chain choice model, which is a very general choice model encompassing many popular models. The existing literature predominantly assumes that the customer arrival process and the Markov chain choice model parameters are given as input to the stochastic optimization model. However, in practice, decision makers may not have this information and must learn them while maximizing the total expected revenue on the fly. In “Online Learning for Constrained Assortment Optimization under the Markov Chain Choice Model,” S. Li, Q. Luo, Z. Huang, and C. Shi developed a series of online learning algorithms for Markov chain choice-based assortment optimization problems with efficiency, as well as provable performance guarantees.
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A Statistical Learning Approach to Personalization in Revenue Management
We consider a logit model-based framework for modeling joint pricing and assortment decisions that take into account customer features. This model provides a significant advantage when one has insufficient data for any one customer and wishes to generalize learning about one customer’s preferences to the population. Under this model, we study the statistical learning task of model fitting from a static store of precollected customer data. This setting, in contrast to the popular learning and earning paradigm, represents the situation many business teams encounter in which their data collection abilities have outstripped their data analysis capabilities. In this learning setting, we establish finite-sample convergence guarantees on the model parameters. The parameter convergence guarantees are then extended to out-of-sample performance guarantees in terms of revenue, in the form of a high-probability bound on the gap between the expected revenue of the best action taken under the estimated parameters and the revenue generated by a decision maker with full knowledge of the choice model. We further discuss practical implications of these bounds. We demonstrate the personalization approach using ticket purchase data from an airline carrier. This paper was accepted by J. George Shanthikumar, special issue on data-driven prescriptive analytics
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- Award ID(s):
- 1845444
- PAR ID:
- 10301867
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- Management Science
- ISSN:
- 0025-1909
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.3772
