- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10310224
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security (CCS)
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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Symbolic methods have been used extensively for proving security of cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-Yao model, and more recently for proving security of cryptographic primitives and constructions in the computational model. However, existing methods for proving security of cryptographic constructions in the computational model often require significant expertise and interaction, or are fairly limitedin scope and expressivity. This paper introduces a symbolic approach for proving security of cryptographic constructions based on the Learning With Errors assumption (Regev, STOC 2005). Such constructions are instances of lattice-based cryptography and are extremely important due to their potential role in post-quantum cryptography. Following (Barthe, Gregoire and Schmidt, CCS 2015), our approach combines a computational logic and deducibility problems—a standard tool for representing the adversary’s knowledge, the Dolev-Yao model. The computational logic is used to capture (indistinguishability-based) security notions and drive the security proofs whereas deducibility problems are used as side-conditions to control that rules of the logic are applied correctly. We then use AutoLWE, an implementation of the logic, to deliver very short or even automatic proofs of several emblematic constructions, including CPAPKE (Gentry et al., STOC 2008), (Hierarchical) Identity-Based Encryption (Agrawal et al. Eurocrypt 2010), Inner Product Encryption (Agrawal et al. Asiacrypt 2011), CCA-PKE (Micciancio et al., Eurocrypt 2012). The main technical novelty beyond AutoLWE is a set of (semi-)decision procedures for deducibility problems, using extensions of Grobner basis computations for subalgebras in the non-commutative setting (instead of ideals in the commutative setting). Our procedures cover the theory of matrices, which is required for lattice-based assumption, as well as the theory of non-commutative rings, fields, and Diffie-Hellman exponentiation, in its standard, bilinear and multilinear forms. Additionally, AutoLWE supports oracle-relative assumptions, which are used specifically to apply (advanced forms of) the Leftover Hash Lemma, an information-theoretical tool widely used in lattice-based proofs.more » « less
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Symbolic methods have been used extensively for proving security of cryptographic protocols in the Dolev-Yao model, and more recently for proving security of cryptographic primitives and constructions in the computational model. However, existing methods for proving security of cryptographic constructions in the computational model often require significant expertise and interaction, or are fairly limited in scope and expressivity. This paper introduces a symbolic approach for proving security of cryptographic constructions based on the Learning With Errors assumption (Regev, STOC 2005). Such constructions are instances of lattice-based cryptography and are extremely important due to their potential role in post-quantum cryptography. Following (Barthe, Gre ́goire and Schmidt, CCS 2015), our approach combines a computational logic and deducibility problems—a standard tool for representing the adversary’s knowledge, the Dolev-Yao model. The computational logic is used to capture (indistinguishability-based) security notions and drive the security proofs whereas deducibility problems are used as side-conditions to control that rules of the logic are applied correctly. We then use AutoLWE, an implementation of the logic, to deliver very short or even automatic proofs of several emblematic constructions, including CPA- PKE (Gentry et al., STOC 2008), (Hierarchical) Identity-Based Encryption (Agrawal et al. Eurocrypt 2010), Inner Product Encryption (Agrawal et al. Asiacrypt 2011), CCA-PKE (Micciancio et al., Eurocrypt 2012). The main technical novelty beyond AutoLWE is a set of (semi-)decision procedures for deducibility problems, using extensions of Grobner basis computations for subalgebras in the (non-)commutative setting (instead of ideals in the commutative setting). Our procedures cover the theory of matrices, which is required for lattice-based assumption, as well as the theory of non-commutative rings, fields, and Diffie-Hellman exponentiation, in its standard, bilinear and multilinear forms. Additionally, AutoLWE supports oracle-relative assumptions, which are used specifically to apply (advanced forms of) the Leftover Hash Lemma, an information-theoretical tool widely used in lattice-based proofs.more » « less
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Cas Cremers and Engin Kirda (Ed.)Vector Oblivious Linear Evaluation (VOLE) supports fast and scalable interactive Zero-Knowledge (ZK) proofs. Despite recent improvements to VOLE-based ZK, compiling proof statements to a control-flow oblivious form (e.g., a circuit) continues to lead to expensive proofs. One useful setting where this inefficiency stands out is when the statement is a disjunction of clauses $\mathcal{L}_1 \lor \cdots \lor \mathcal{L}_B$. Typically, ZK requires paying the price to handle all $B$ branches. Prior works have shown how to avoid this price in communication, but not in computation. Our main result, $\mathsf{Batchman}$, is asymptotically and concretely efficient VOLE-based ZK for batched disjunctions, i.e. statements containing $R$ repetitions of the same disjunction. This is crucial for, e.g., emulating CPU steps in ZK. Our prover and verifier complexity is only $\bigO(RB+R|\C|+B|\C|)$, where $|\C|$ is the maximum circuit size of the $B$ branches. Prior works' computation scales in $RB|\C|$. For non-batched disjunctions, we also construct a VOLE-based ZK protocol, $\mathsf{Robin}$, which is (only) communication efficient. For small fields and for statistical security parameter $\lambda$, this protocol's communication improves over the previous state of the art ($\mathsf{Mac'n'Cheese}$, Baum et al., CRYPTO'21) by up to factor $\lambda$. Our implementation outperforms prior state of the art. E.g., we achieve up to $6\times$ improvement over $\mathsf{Mac'n'Cheese}$ (Boolean, single disjunction), and for arithmetic batched disjunctions our experiments show we improve over $\mathsf{QuickSilver}$ (Yang et al., CCS'21) by up to $70\times$ and over $\mathsf{AntMan}$ (Weng et al., CCS'22) by up to $36\times$.more » « less
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Abstract We prove that
-depth local random quantum circuits with two qudit nearest-neighbor gates on a$${{\,\textrm{poly}\,}}(t) \cdot n^{1/D}$$ D -dimensional lattice withn qudits are approximatet -designs in various measures. These include the “monomial” measure, meaning that the monomials of a random circuit from this family have expectation close to the value that would result from the Haar measure. Previously, the best bound was due to Brandão–Harrow–Horodecki (Commun Math Phys 346(2):397–434, 2016) for$${{\,\textrm{poly}\,}}(t)\cdot n$$ . We also improve the “scrambling” and “decoupling” bounds for spatially local random circuits due to Brown and Fawzi (Scrambling speed of random quantum circuits, 2012). One consequence of our result is that assuming the polynomial hierarchy ($$D=1$$ ) is infinite and that certain counting problems are$${{\,\mathrm{\textsf{PH}}\,}}$$ -hard “on average”, sampling within total variation distance from these circuits is hard for classical computers. Previously, exact sampling from the outputs of even constant-depth quantum circuits was known to be hard for classical computers under these assumptions. However the standard strategy for extending this hardness result to approximate sampling requires the quantum circuits to have a property called “anti-concentration”, meaning roughly that the output has near-maximal entropy. Unitary 2-designs have the desired anti-concentration property. Our result improves the required depth for this level of anti-concentration from linear depth to a sub-linear value, depending on the geometry of the interactions. This is relevant to a recent experiment by the Google Quantum AI group to perform such a sampling task with 53 qubits on a two-dimensional lattice (Arute in Nature 574(7779):505–510, 2019; Boixo et al. in Nate Phys 14(6):595–600, 2018) (and related experiments by USTC), and confirms their conjecture that$$\#{\textsf{P}}$$ depth suffices for anti-concentration. The proof is based on a previous construction of$$O(\sqrt{n})$$ t -designs by Brandão et al. (2016), an analysis of how approximate designs behave under composition, and an extension of the quasi-orthogonality of permutation operators developed by Brandão et al. (2016). Different versions of the approximate design condition correspond to different norms, and part of our contribution is to introduce the norm corresponding to anti-concentration and to establish equivalence between these various norms for low-depth circuits. For random circuits with long-range gates, we use different methods to show that anti-concentration happens at circuit size corresponding to depth$$O(n\ln ^2 n)$$ . We also show a lower bound of$$O(\ln ^3 n)$$ for the size of such circuit in this case. We also prove that anti-concentration is possible in depth$$\Omega (n \ln n)$$ (size$$O(\ln n \ln \ln n)$$ ) using a different model.$$O(n \ln n \ln \ln n)$$ -
Abstract In a Merlin–Arthur proof system, the proof verifier (Arthur) accepts valid proofs (from Merlin) with probability 1, and rejects invalid proofs with probability arbitrarily close to 1. The running time of such a system is defined to be the length of Merlin’s proof plus the running time of Arthur. We provide new Merlin–Arthur proof systems for some key problems in fine-grained complexity. In several cases our proof systems have optimal running time. Our main results include:
Certifying that a list of
n integers has no 3-SUM solution can be done in Merlin–Arthur time . Previously, Carmosino et al. [ITCS 2016] showed that the problem has a nondeterministic algorithm running in$$\tilde{O}(n)$$ time (that is, there is a proof system with proofs of length$$\tilde{O}(n^{1.5})$$ and a deterministic verifier running in$$\tilde{O}(n^{1.5})$$ time).$$\tilde{O}(n^{1.5})$$ Counting the number of
k -cliques with total edge weight equal to zero in ann -node graph can be done in Merlin–Arthur time (where$${\tilde{O}}(n^{\lceil k/2\rceil })$$ ). For odd$$k\ge 3$$ k , this bound can be further improved for sparse graphs: for example, counting the number of zero-weight triangles in anm -edge graph can be done in Merlin–Arthur time . Previous Merlin–Arthur protocols by Williams [CCC’16] and Björklund and Kaski [PODC’16] could only count$${\tilde{O}}(m)$$ k -cliques in unweighted graphs, and had worse running times for smallk .Computing the All-Pairs Shortest Distances matrix for an
n -node graph can be done in Merlin–Arthur time . Note this is optimal, as the matrix can have$$\tilde{O}(n^2)$$ nonzero entries in general. Previously, Carmosino et al. [ITCS 2016] showed that this problem has an$$\Omega (n^2)$$ nondeterministic time algorithm.$$\tilde{O}(n^{2.94})$$ Certifying that an
n -variablek -CNF is unsatisfiable can be done in Merlin–Arthur time . We also observe an algebrization barrier for the previous$$2^{n/2 - n/O(k)}$$ -time Merlin–Arthur protocol of R. Williams [CCC’16] for$$2^{n/2}\cdot \textrm{poly}(n)$$ SAT: in particular, his protocol algebrizes, and we observe there is no algebrizing protocol for$$\#$$ k -UNSAT running in time. Therefore we have to exploit non-algebrizing properties to obtain our new protocol.$$2^{n/2}/n^{\omega (1)}$$ Certifying a Quantified Boolean Formula is true can be done in Merlin–Arthur time
. Previously, the only nontrivial result known along these lines was an Arthur–Merlin–Arthur protocol (where Merlin’s proof depends on some of Arthur’s coins) running in$$2^{4n/5}\cdot \textrm{poly}(n)$$ time.$$2^{2n/3}\cdot \textrm{poly}(n)$$ n integers can be done in Merlin–Arthur time , improving on the previous best protocol by Nederlof [IPL 2017] which took$$2^{n/3}\cdot \textrm{poly}(n)$$ time.$$2^{0.49991n}\cdot \textrm{poly}(n)$$