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Title: Bayesian Repeated Zero-Sum Games with Persistent State, with Application to Security Games
Award ID(s):
1814056
NSF-PAR ID:
10311472
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
Web and Internet Economics - 16th International Conference, WINE 2020
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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