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1. Threat-Aware Selection for Target Engagement

   https://doi.org/10.1109/CASE49997.2022.9926456  

   Biediger, Daniel; Becker, Aaron T. (August 2022, 18th IEEE International Conference on Automation Science and Engineering, CASE)

   This paper investigates the scheduling problem related to engaging a swarm of attacking drones with a single defensive turret. The defending turret must turn, with a limited slew rate, and remain facing a drone for a dwell time to eliminate it. The turret must eliminate all the drones in the swarm before any drone reaches the turret. In 2D, this is an example of a Traveling Salesman Problem with Time Windows (TSPTW) where the turret must visit each target during the window. In 2D, the targets and turret are restricted to a plane and the turret rotates with one degree of freedom. In 3D, the turret can pan and tilt, while the drones attempt to reach a safe zone anywhere along the vertical axis above the turret. This 3D movement makes the problem more challenging, since the azimuth angles of the turret to the drones vary as a function of time. This paper investigates the theoretical optimal solution for simple swarm configurations. It compares heuristic approaches for the path scheduling problem in 2D and 3D using a simulation of the swarm behavior. It provides results for an improved heuristic approach, the Threat-Aware Nearest Neighbor. 

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2. Compromising Flight Paths of Autopiloted Drones

   https://doi.org/10.1109/ICUAS.2019.8798162  

   Chen, W; Dong, Y; Duan, Z (June 2019, 2019 International Conference on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (ICUAS))

   While more and more consumer drones are abused in recent attacks, there is still very little systematical research on countering malicious consumer drones. In this paper, we focus on this issue and develop effective attacks to common autopilot control algorithms to compromise the flight paths of autopiloted drones, e.g., leading them away from its preset paths. We consider attacking an autopiloted drone in three phases: attacking its onboard sensors, attacking its state estimation, and attacking its autopilot algorithms. Several firstphase attacks have been developed (e.g., [1]–[4]); second-phase attacks (including our previous work [5], [6]) have also been investigated. In this paper, we focus on the third-phase attacks. We examine three common autopilot algorithms, and design several attacks by exploiting their weaknesses to mislead a drone from its preset path to a manipulated path. We present the formal analysis of the scope of such manipulated paths. We further discuss how to apply the proposed attacks to disrupt preset drone missions, such as missing a target in searching an area or misleading a drone to intercept another drone, etc. Many potential attacks can be built on top of the proposed attacks. We are currently investigating different models to apply such attacks on common drone missions and also building prototype systems on ArduPilot for real world tests. We will further investigate countermeasures to address the potential damages. 

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3. Manipulating Drone Position Control

   https://doi.org/10.1109/CNS.2019.8802817  

   Chen, Wenxin; Dong, Yingfei; Duan, Zhenhai (June 2019, 2019 IEEE Conference on Communications and Network Security (CNS))

   Although consumer drones have been used in many attacks, besides specific methods such as jamming, very little research has been conducted on systematical methods to counter these drones. In this paper, we develop generic methods to compromise drone position control algorithms in order to make malicious drones deviate from their targets. Taking advantage of existing methods to remotely manipulate drone sensors through cyber or physical attacks (e.g., [1], [2]), we exploited the weaknesses of position estimation and autopilot controller algorithms on consumer drones in the proposed attacks. For compromising drone position control, we first designed two state estimation attacks: a maximum False Data Injection (FDI) attack and a generic FDI attack that compromised the Kalman-Filter-based position estimation (arguably the most popular method). Furthermore, based on the above attacks, we proposed two attacks on autopilot-based navigation, to compromise the actual position of a malicious drone. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first piece of work in this area. Our analysis and simulation results show that the proposed attacks can significantly affect the position estimation and the actual positions of drones. We also proposed potential countermeasures to address these attacks. 

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4. Detection and Tracking of Drone Swarms using LiDAR

   Abir, Tasnim; Le, Vu; Kuantama, Endrowednes; Gupta, Pranjol; Copley, Austin; Dawes, Judith; Islam, Mohammad; Han, Richard; Nguyen, Phuc (June 2025, ACM MobiSys 2025)

   This paper introduces LiSWARM, a low-cost LiDAR system to detect and track individual drones in a large swarm. LiSWARM provides robust and precise localization and recognition of drones in 3D space, which is not possible with state-of-the-art drone tracking systems that rely on radio-frequency (RF), acoustic, or RGB image signatures. It includes (1) an efficient data processing pipeline to process the point clouds, (2) robust priority-aware clustering algorithms to isolate swarm data from the background, (3) a reliable neural network-based algorithm to recognize the drones, and (4) a technique to track the trajectory of every drone in the swarm. We develop the LiSWARM prototype and validate it through both in-lab and field experiments. Notably, we measure its performance during two drone light shows involving 150 and 500 drones and confirm that the system achieves up to 98% accuracy in recognizing drones and reliably tracking drone trajectories. To evaluate the scalability of LiSWARM, we conduct a thorough analysis to benchmark the system’s performance with a swarm consisting of 15,000 drones. The results demonstrate the potential to leverage LiSWARM for other applications, such as battlefield operations, errant drone detection, and securing sensitive areas such as airports and prisons. 

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5. Efficient Authentication of Drones to mmWave Wireless Mesh Networks in Post-Disaster Scenarios

   https://doi.org/10.1109/GLOBECOM42002.2020.9322282  

   Abdel-Malek, Mai A.; Akkaya, Kemal; Saputro, Nico; Ibrahim, Ahmed S. (December 2020, GLOBECOM 2020 - 2020 IEEE Global Communications Conference)

   null (Ed.)

   Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), or drones, are increasingly being utilized for public safety circumstances including post-disaster recovery of destroyed communication infrastructure. For instance, drones are temporarily positioned within an affected area to create a wireless mesh network among public safety personnel. To serve the need for high-rate video-based damage assessment, drone-assisted communication can utilize high- bandwidth millimeter wave (mmWave) technologies such as IEEE 802.11ad. However, short-range mmWave communication makes it hard for optimally- positioned drones to be authenticated with a centralized network control center. Therefore and assuming that there are potential imposters, we propose two lightweight and fast authentication mechanisms that take into account the physical limitations of mmWave communication. First, we propose a drone-to-drone authentication mechanism, which is based on proxy signatures from a control center. Accordingly, any newly joining drone can authenticate itself to an exist one rather than attempting to authenticate to the outof-reach control center. Second, we propose a drone-to- ground authentication mechanism, to enable each drone to authenticate itself to its associated ground users. Such authentication approach is based on challenge-response broadcast type, and it is still utilizing fast proxy signature approach. The evaluation of the proposed authentication mechanisms, conducted using NS-3 implementation of IEEE 802.11ad protocol, show their efficiency and practicality. 

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