Many service systems provide queue length information to customers, thereby allowing customers to choose among many options of service. However, queue length information is often delayed, and it is often not provided in real time. Recent work by Dong et al. [Dong J, Yom-Tov E, Yom-Tov GB (2018) The impact of delay announcements on hospital network coordination and waiting times. Management Sci. 65(5):1969–1994.] explores the impact of these delays in an empirical study in U.S. hospitals. Work by Pender et al. [Pender J, Rand RH, Wesson E (2017) Queues with choice via delay differential equations. Internat. J. Bifurcation Chaos Appl. Sci. Engrg. 27(4):1730016-1–1730016-20.] uses a two-dimensional fluid model to study the impact of delayed information and determine the exact threshold under which delayed information can cause oscillations in the dynamics of the queue length. In this work, we confirm that the fluid model analyzed by Pender et al. [Pender J, Rand RH, Wesson E (2017) Queues with choice via delay differential equations. Internat. J. Bifurcation Chaos Appl. Sci. Engrg. 27(4):1730016-1–1730016-20.] can be rigorously obtained as a functional law of large numbers limit of a stochastic queueing process, and we generalize their threshold analysis to arbitrary dimensions. Moreover, we prove a functional central limit theorem for the queue length process and show that the scaled queue length converges to a stochastic delay differential equation. Thus, our analysis sheds new insight on how delayed information can produce unexpected system dynamics.
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Breaking the Symmetry in Queues with Delayed Information
Giving customers queue length information about a service system has the potential to influence the decision of a customer to join a queue. Thus, it is imperative for managers of queueing systems to understand how the information that they provide will affect the performance of the system. To this end, we construct and analyze a two-dimensional deterministic fluid model that incorporates customer choice behavior based on delayed queue length information. Reports in the existing literature always assume that all queues have identical parameters and the underlying dynamical system is symmetric. However, in this paper, we relax this symmetry assumption by allowing the arrival rates, service rates, and the choice model parameters to be different for each queue. Our methodology exploits the method of multiple scales and asymptotic analysis to understand how to break the symmetry. We find that the asymmetry can have a large impact on the underlying dynamics of the queueing system.
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- Award ID(s):
- 1751975
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10335436
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- International Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos
- Volume:
- 31
- Issue:
- 09
- ISSN:
- 0218-1274
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 2130027
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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Supplemental Material: The online appendix is available at https://doi.org/10.1287/msom.2023.1190 .
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Journal Article:
- https://doi.org/10.1142/S0218127421300275
