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This content will become publicly available on May 11, 2023

Title: Walrasian Equilibrium-Based Pricing Mechanism for Health-Data Crowdsensing Under Information Asymmetry
While prior studies have designed incentive mechanisms to attract the public to share their collected data, they tend to ignore information asymmetry between data requesters and collectors. In reality, the sensing costs information (time cost, battery drainage, bandwidth occupation of mobile devices, and so on) is the private information of collectors, which is unknown by the data requester. In this article, we model the strategic interactions between health-data requester and collectors using a bilevel optimization model. Considering that the crowdsensing market is open and the participants are equal, we propose a Walrasian equilibrium-based pricing mechanism to coordinate the interest conflicts between health-data requesters and collectors. Specifically, based on the exchange economic theory, we transform the bilevel optimization problem into a social welfare maximization problem with the constraint condition that the balance between supply and demand, and dual decomposition is then employed to divide the social welfare maximization problem into a set of subproblems that can be solved by health-data requesters and collectors. We prove that the optimal task price is equal to the marginal utility generated by the collector's health data. To avoid obtaining the collector's private information, a distributed iterative algorithm is then designed to obtain the optimal task more » pricing strategy. Furthermore, we conduct computational experiments to evaluate the performance of the proposed pricing mechanism and analyze the effects of intrinsic rewards, sensing costs on optimal task prices, and collectors' health-data supplies. « less
Authors:
; ;
Award ID(s):
1761022
Publication Date:
NSF-PAR ID:
10377875
Journal Name:
IEEE Transactions on Computational Social Systems
Page Range or eLocation-ID:
1 to 11
ISSN:
2373-7476
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
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