We consider the following communication problem: Alice and Bob each have some valuation functions $v_1(\cdot)$ and $v_2(\cdot)$ over subsets of $m$ items, and their goal is to partition the items into $S, \bar{S}$ in a way that maximizes the welfare, $v_1(S) + v_2(\bar{S})$. We study both the allocation problem, which asks for a welfare-maximizing partition and the decision problem, which asks whether or not there exists a partition guaranteeing certain welfare, for binary XOS valuations. For interactive protocols with $poly(m)$ communication, a tight 3/4-approximation is known for both [Fei06,DS06].
For interactive protocols, the allocation problem is provably harder than the decision problem: any solution to the allocation problem implies a solution to the decision problem with one additional round and $\log m$ additional bits of communication via a trivial reduction. Surprisingly, the allocation problem is provably easier for simultaneous protocols. Specifically, we show:
1) There exists a simultaneous, randomized protocol with polynomial communication that selects a partition whose expected welfare is at least $3/4$ of the optimum. This matches the guarantee of the best interactive, randomized protocol with polynomial communication.
2) For all $\varepsilon > 0$, any simultaneous, randomized protocol that decides whether the welfare of the optimal partition is $\geq 1$ or $\leq 3/4 - 1/108+\varepsilon$ correctly with probability $> 1/2 + 1/ poly(m)$ requires exponential communication. This provides a separation between the attainable approximation guarantees via interactive ($3/4$) versus simultaneous ($\leq 3/4-1/108$) protocols with polynomial communication.
In other words, this trivial reduction from decision to allocation problems provably requires the extra round of communication.
We further discuss the implications of our results for the design of truthful combinatorial auctions in general, and extensions to general XOS valuations. In particular, our protocol for the allocation problem implies a new style of truthful mechanisms.
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On the hardness of dominant strategy mechanism design
We study the communication complexity of dominant strategy implementations of combinatorial auctions. We start with two domains that are generally considered “easy”: multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal values and combinatorial auctions with gross substitutes valuations. For both domains we have fast algorithms that find the welfare-maximizing allocation with communication complexity that is poly-logarithmic in the input size. This immediately implies that welfare maximization can be achieved in ex-post equilibrium with no significant communication cost, by using VCG payments. In contrast, we show that in both domains the communication complexity of any dominant strategy implementation that achieves the optimal welfare is polynomial in the input size.
We then move on to studying the approximation ratios achievable by dominant strategy mechanisms. For multi-unit auctions with decreasing marginal values, we provide a dominant-strategy communication FPTAS. For combinatorial auctions with general valuations, we show that there is no dominant strategy mechanism that achieves an approximation ratio better than m1−є that uses poly(m,n) bits of communication, where m is the number of items and n is the number of bidders. In contrast, a randomized dominant strategy mechanism that achieves an O(√m) approximation with poly(m,n) communication is known. This proves the first gap between computationally efficient deterministic dominant strategy mechanisms and randomized ones.
En route, we answer an open question on the communication cost of implementing dominant strategy mechanisms for more than two players, and also solve some open problems in the area of simultaneous combinatorial auctions.
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- Award ID(s):
- 2127781
- NSF-PAR ID:
- 10352728
- Editor(s):
- Stefano Leonardi
- Date Published:
- Journal Name:
- STOC 2022: Proceedings of the 54th Annual ACM SIGACT Symposium on Theory of Computing
- Page Range / eLocation ID:
- 690 to 703
- Format(s):
- Medium: X
- Sponsoring Org:
- National Science Foundation
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We study combinatorial auctions with interdependent valuations, where each agent i has a private signal sithat captures her private information and the valuation function of every agent depends on the entire signal profile, [Formula: see text]. The literature in economics shows that the interdependent model gives rise to strong impossibility results and identifies assumptions under which optimal solutions can be attained. The computer science literature provides approximation results for simple single-parameter settings (mostly single-item auctions or matroid feasibility constraints). Both bodies of literature focus largely on valuations satisfying a technical condition termed single crossing (or variants thereof). We consider the class of submodular over signals (SOS) valuations (without imposing any single crossing-type assumption) and provide the first welfare approximation guarantees for multidimensional combinatorial auctions achieved by universally ex post incentive-compatible, individually rational mechanisms. Our main results are (i) four approximation for any single-parameter downward-closed setting with single-dimensional signals and SOS valuations; (ii) four approximation for any combinatorial auction with multidimensional signals and separable-SOS valuations; and (iii) (k + 3) and (2 log(k) + 4) approximation for any combinatorial auction with single-dimensional signals, with k-sized signal space, for SOS and strong-SOS valuations, respectively. All of our results extend to a parameterized version of SOS, d-approximate SOS, while losing a factor that depends on d.
Funding: A. Eden was partially supported by NSF Award IIS-2007887, the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Seventh Framework Programme [FP7/2007-2013]/ERC Grant Agreement 337122, by the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 317/17], and by an Amazon research award. M. Feldman received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation program [Grant Agreement 866132], by the Israel Science Foundation [Grant 317/17], by an Amazon research award, and by the NSF-BSF [Grant 2020788]. The work of K. Goldner was supported partially by NSF awards DMS-1903037 and CNS-2228610 and a Shibulal Family Career Development Professorship. A. R. Karlin was supported by the NSF-CCF [Grant 1813135].
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- Free Publicly Accessible Full Text
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Accepted Manuscript1.0
- Conference Paper:
- https://doi.org/10.1145/3519935.3520013
