skip to main content


Title: Fairness via Explanation Quality: Evaluating Disparities in the Quality of Post hoc Explanations
Award ID(s):
2008461 2040989
PAR ID:
10381420
Author(s) / Creator(s):
; ; ; ;
Date Published:
Journal Name:
AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
Page Range / eLocation ID:
203 to 214
Format(s):
Medium: X
Sponsoring Org:
National Science Foundation
More Like this
  1. null (Ed.)
    Regulations, standards, and guidelines for safety-critical systems stipulate stringent traceability but do not prescribe the corresponding, detailed software engineering process. Given the industrial practice of using only semi-formal notations to describe engineering processes, processes are rarely ``executable'' and developers have to spend significant manual effort in ensuring that they follow the steps mandated by quality assurance. The size and complexity of systems and regulations makes manual, timely feedback from Quality Assurance (QA) engineers infeasible. In this paper we propose a novel framework for tracking processes in the background, automatically checking QA constraints depending on process progress, and informing the developer of unfulfilled QA constraints. We evaluate our approach by applying it to two different case studies; one open source community system and a safety-critical system in the air-traffic control domain. Results from the analysis show that trace links are often corrected or completed after the fact and thus timely and automated constraint checking support has significant potential on reducing rework. 
    more » « less
  2. In this work we propose a model where the value of a buyer for some product (like a slice of pizza) is a combination of their personal desire for the product (how hungry they are for pizza) and the quality of the product (how good the pizza is). Sellers in this setting have a two-dimensional optimization problem of determining both the quality level at which to make their product (how expensive ingredients to use) and the price at which to sell it. We analyze optimal seller strategies as well as analogs of Walrasian equilibria in this setting. A key question we are interested in is: to what extent will the price of a good be a reliable indicator of the good’s quality? One result we show is that indeed in this model, price will be a surprisingly robust signal for quality under optimal seller behavior. In particular, while the specific quality and price that a seller should choose will depend highly on the specific distribution of buyers, for optimal sellers, price and quality will be linearly related, independent of that distribution. We also show that for the case of multiple buyers and sellers, an analog of Walrasian equilibrium exists in this setting, and can be found via a natural tatonnement process. Finally, we analyze markets with a combination of “locals” (who know the quality of each good) and “tourists” (who do not) and analyze under what conditions the market will become a tourist trap, setting quality to zero while keeping prices high. 
    more » « less