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1. Policy Abstraction and Nash Refinement in Tree-Exploiting PSRO

   Konicki, Christine; Chakraborty, Mithun; Wellman, Michael P (May 2025, Proceedings of the 24th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems (AAMAS-2025))

   Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO) interleaves empirical game-theoretic analysis with deep reinforcement learning (DRL) to solve games too complex for traditional analytic methods. Tree-exploiting PSRO (TE-PSRO) is a variant of this approach that iteratively builds a coarsened empirical game model in extensive form using data obtained from querying a simulator that represents a detailed description of the game.We make two main methodological advances to TE-PSRO that enhance its applicability to complex games of imperfect information. First, we introduce a scalable representation for the empirical game tree where edges correspond to implicit policies learned through DRL. These policies cover conditions in the underlying game abstracted in the game model, supporting sustainable growth of the tree over epochs. Second, we leverage extensive form in the empirical model by employing refined Nash equilibria to direct strategy exploration. To enable this, we give a modular and scalable algorithm based on generalized backward induction for computing a subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) in an imperfect-information game. We experimentally evaluate our approach on a suite of games including an alternating-offer bargaining game with outside offers; our results demonstrate that TE-PSRO converges toward equilibrium faster when new strategies are generated based on SPE rather than Nash equilibrium, and with reasonable time/memory requirements for the growing empirical model. 

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2. No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium

   Celli, A.; Marchesi, A.; Farina, G.; Gatti, N. (January 2020, NeurIPS)

   null (Ed.)

   The existence of simple, uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years that when all players seek to minimize their internal regret in a repeated normal-form game, the empirical frequency of play converges to a normal-form correlated equilibrium. Extensive-form (that is, tree-form) games generalize normal-form games by modeling both sequential and simultaneous moves, as well as private information. Because of the sequential nature and presence of partial information in the game, extensive-form correlation has significantly different properties than the normal-form counterpart, many of which are still open research directions. Extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as the natural extensive-form counterpart to normal-form correlated equilibrium. However, it was currently unknown whether EFCE emerges as the result of uncoupled agent dynamics. In this paper, we give the first uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to the set of EFCEs in n-player general-sum extensive-form games with perfect recall. First, we introduce a notion of trigger regret in extensive-form games, which extends that of internal regret in normal-form games. When each player has low trigger regret, the empirical frequency of play is close to an EFCE. Then, we give an efficient no-trigger-regret algorithm. Our algorithm decomposes trigger regret into local subproblems at each decision point for the player, and constructs a global strategy of the player from the local solutions at each decision point. 

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3. No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium

   Celli, A.; Marchesi, A.; Farina, G.; Gatti, N. (January 2020, NeurIPS Workshop on Cooperative AI)

   null (Ed.)

   The existence of simple, uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years that when all players seek to minimize their internal regret in a repeated normal-form game, the empirical frequency of play converges to a normal-form correlated equilibrium. Extensive-form (that is, tree-form) games generalize normal-form games by modeling both sequential and simultaneous moves, as well as private information. Because of the sequential nature and presence of partial information in the game, extensive-form correlation has significantly different properties than the normal-form counterpart, many of which are still open research directions. Extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as the natural extensive-form counterpart to normal-form correlated equilibrium. However, it was currently unknown whether EFCE emerges as the result of uncoupled agent dynamics. In this paper, we give the first uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to the set of EFCEs in n-player general-sum extensive-form games with perfect recall. First, we introduce a notion of trigger regret in extensive-form games, which extends that of internal regret in normal-form games. When each player has low trigger regret, the empirical frequency of play is close to an EFCE. Then, we give an efficient no-trigger-regret algorithm. Our algorithm decomposes trigger regret into local subproblems at each decision point for the player, and constructs a global strategy of the player from the local solutions at each decision point. 

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4. Simple Uncoupled No-Regret Learning Dynamics for Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium

   Farina, G.; Celli, A.; Marchesi, A.; Gatti, N. (January 2021, ArXivorg)

   null (Ed.)

   The existence of simple uncoupled no-regret learning dynamics that converge to correlated equilibria in normal-form games is a celebrated result in the theory of multi-agent systems. Specifically, it has been known for more than 20 years that when all players seek to minimize their internal regret in a repeated normal-form game, the empirical frequency of play converges to a normal-form correlated equilibrium. Extensive-form games generalize normal-form games by modeling both sequential and simultaneous moves, as well as imperfect information. Because of the sequential nature and presence of private information in the game, correlation in extensive-form games possesses significantly different properties than its counterpart in normal-form games, many of which are still open research directions. Extensive-form correlated equilibrium (EFCE) has been proposed as the natural extensive-form counterpart to the classical notion of correlated equilibrium in normal-form games. Compared to the latter, the constraints that define the set of EFCEs are significantly more complex, as the correlation device must keep into account the evolution of beliefs of each player as they make observations throughout the game. Due to that significant added complexity, the existence of uncoupled learning dynamics leading to an EFCE has remained a challenging open research question for a long time. In this article, we settle that question by giving the first uncoupled no-regret dynamics that converge to the set of EFCEs in n-player general-sum extensive-form games with perfect recall. We show that each iterate can be computed in time polynomial in the size of the game tree, and that, when all players play repeatedly according to our learning dynamics, the empirical frequency of play is proven to be a O(T^-0.5)-approximate EFCE with high probability after T game repetitions, and an EFCE almost surely in the limit. 

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5. Mechanistic and Data-Driven Agent-Based Models to Explain Human Behavior in Online Networked Group Anagram Games

   https://doi.org/10.1145/3341161.3342965  

   Cedeno‑Mieles, Vanessa; Hu, Zhihao; Ren, Yihui; Deng, Xinwei; Adiga, Abhigin; Barrett, Christopher; Contractor, Noshir; Ekanayake, Saliya; Epstein, Joshua M.; Goode, Brian J.; et al (January 2019, Proceedings of the International Conference on Advances in Social Network Analysis and Mining)

   null (Ed.)

   In anagram games, players are provided with letters for forming as many words as possible over a specified time duration. Anagram games have been used in controlled experiments to study problems such as collective identity, effects of goal setting, internal-external attributions, test anxiety, and others. The majority of work on anagram games involves individual players. Recently, work has expanded to group anagram games where players cooperate by sharing letters. In this work, we analyze experimental data from online social networked experiments of group anagram games. We develop mechanistic and data driven models of human decision-making to predict detailed game player actions (e.g., what word to form next). With these results, we develop a composite agent-based modeling and simulation platform that incorporates the models from data analysis. We compare model predictions against experimental data, which enables us to provide explanations of human decision-making and behavior. Finally, we provide illustrative case studies using agent-based simulations to demonstrate the efficacy of models to provide insights that are beyond those from experiments alone. 

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